If Oppy had even tried to show that (just) *some* (any?) of this handbook's chapters reflect the commitments behind the (rather anodyne) editors' remarks and, thus, are problematic then I would not be complaining. But he is so unengaged with the volume that he is not performing his minimal duty of critical engagement with the scholarship presented in the handbook. Basically, NDPR is permitting a senior figure to share his prejudices (which I may share) at the expense of his professional obligations. Oppy could start a blog, or do guest-post on NewApps if he wants a soap-box. Finally, the idea that Oppy is "careful" is a rhetorical joke--he fails to show that his distinctions apply here. (Not to mention that some of his distinctions are question-begging in dialectical context.)

We know who pays the consultants. So, if you want to get more honest consultants you need to change the incentive system for them.

Allan, I like what you say about Tolkien's position. However, what follows when you use "essentially," "obviously," and "hardly seems" tends to be question-begging.

Apologies for the typos in your name. I believe these are now corrected.

Well, they do place some value on their own lives.

I paid US$0.99--so on the high side, but probably still low-balling its worth to me.

No, the final destination is to turn universities into real estate funds (in Europe--Stateside they can be turned into hedge funds).

Yes, it looks to me that according to Wollstonecraft ability to reason is a kind of -- perhaps unintended byproduct -- developmental achievement. Her reason is more akin to practical reason than theoretical reason (even though she engages in theoretical reason). There is a family resemblance to Adam Smith's position on reason as developed by Maria Carrasco in an important article.

Sandrine, thank you for your very quick, critical response. I think we disagree about some crucial interpretive issues and maybe even in our hermeneutics. 1. I read the "digression" as a self-standing, philosophical interlude. I do not think it superficial at all! 2. My point in the post is that in the digression she denies or departs from the (Deist) rationalism that you (rightly) associate with Price. (Moreover, throughout the Vindication she promotes the development of reason by way of the "grand passions" and life's experiences--she rejects the rationalism common among Deists.) 3. I do grant that Wollstonecraft thinks that (a suitably reformed) religion can play a positive role in one's life, but that's compatible with Spinozism (which did not encourage the elimination of religion). 4. On Stoicism. I would rather emphasize the Smithian (neo-Aristotelian) virtue ethic in the Vindication, but when it comes to marriage and love I see her primarily as a disciple of Rousseau without Rousseau's sexism.

Yes, it does. You should also look at Dennis' original post on the topic.

Thanks for reminding us Dennis!

Jarrod, I doubt Prof. Koppl was trying to provoke a vitriolic response.

There are a lot of classic Wimsatt papers, but that's not the one I was thinking about in this context.