This is Daniel Star's Typepad Profile.
Join Typepad and start following Daniel Star's activity
Daniel Star
Department of Philosophy, Boston University
Recent Activity
Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Dale Dorsey's "Moral Distinctiveness and Moral Inquiry," with a critical précis by Kathryn M Lindeman
Posted Apr 18, 2016 at PEA Soup
Comment
31
Upcoming Ethics Discussion, Apr 18-20: Dale Dorsey's "Moral Distinctiveness and Moral Inquiry," with a critical précis by Kathryn M Lindeman
We're excited to announce our next Ethics discussion on Dale Dorsey's "Moral Distinctiveness and Moral Inquiry." The paper is available through open access here. Kathryn M Lindeman has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis. Join us on April 18-20! Continue reading
Posted Apr 11, 2016 at PEA Soup
Comment
0
Most students who complete an Oxford DPhil in philosophy will have previously completed an Oxford BPhil degree (which is also a graduate degree, despite the name). In my experience, quite a few professional philosophers in the US have misconceptions about the BPhil and DPhil combination, misconceptions that are likely to lead to an Oxford graduate education being devalued. The Oxford philosophy department has a description of the BPhil degree here: http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/admissions/graduate/bphil_in_philosophy
Oxford DPhil or American PhD?
A student recently e-mailed me, concerned that the Oxford DPhil was "frowned upon" in the US, which didn't seem to me true. But I invite comment from faculty and students--signed only--about the pros and cons of doing the DPhil at Oxford versus a PhD at a top US department.
Interesting post, Jonathan. I don't see why the reasons primitivist must accept that there are no non-trivial necessary truths about reasons. When we think of other views where some kind of thing is taken to be metaphysically basic or some concept is taken to be unanalyzable (in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, that is), we don't see philosophers accepting a ban on on non-trivial necessary truths. For example: Williamson (2000) claims knowledge is basic and that the concept is unanalyzable, but also makes a whole lot of interesting claims about it (e.g. necessarily, for X to be knowledge, X must be a safe belief).
A Worry About Reasons Primitivism
A recently influential idea in the philosophy of normativity is reasons primitivism. Reasons primitivists hold that we can give no account of what it is for some consideration to be a (normative) reason. At most we can say that reasons are considerations that count in favour (or against) some re...
Daniel Star is now following The Typepad Team
Apr 4, 2010
Subscribe to Daniel Star’s Recent Activity