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Applied Ethics Journals
This is merely a request for information. I know that there are lots and lots of applied ethics journals covering bioethics, health care ethics, global ethics, environmental ethics, business ethics, health care ethics, ethics of war and conflict and many...
Posted Aug 9, 2013 at
Hi sorry to be so late on this - very interesting discussion. I just wanted to give a quick response of the number 1 type. The uncertainty in question is uncertainty about whether something is wrong overall. Ross predicted that this type of uncertainty is widespread. We've got certainty about what makes acts wrong to a degree but we are rarely certain about where the balance of wrongness lies given that how wrong a consideration makes an act in an individual case varies in different contexts. So, consider a person who thinks that there are various things that make eating meat wrong to a degree (causes pain to the animal, leads to global warming and so on) and various considerations that make eating meat right to a degree (the animal is not a person, it's tasty and so on). If this person is uncertain about where the strenghts of these considerations lies, she might conclude that eating meat might be wrong. Assume then that internalism is true about wrong- and right-making judgments: you can sincerely think that something makes an act right/wrong to a degree only if you are motivated to pursue/avoid that thing (this makes my response a variation of your response). This would mean that the person who thinks that eating meat might be wrong would have to care de re about the things that make that act right and wrong even if they are uncertain about the overall judgment. If this person then decides not to eat meat on the grounds that it might be wrong, it is guaranteed that she will have appropriate motivations.
Commented Jul 30, 2013 on
Moral Uncertainty and Motivation
Moral Uncertainty and Motivation
Brian Weatherson has posted a new paper in which he argues against "moral hedging" -- roughly, refraining from A-ing on the grounds that there's a non-zero probability that A-ing is wrong and a zero probability that not A-ing is wrong. I'd like to explain why I think his central argument fails, ...
Subjectivism and Mind-Dependence
I’ve been recently interested in subjectivism and how serious the objections to it are in the end. In part, this is a project of thinking how well or badly off the view comes out when we compare it to expressivism....
Posted May 13, 2013 at
Philosophy in Novels
I know that a lot philosophers I have met and a lot of you who read this blog are avid readers of novels. Because of this, I wanted to post a 'bleg' ('an entry on a blog requesting information or...
Posted Apr 24, 2013 at
Rule-Based Ethical Theories and Counter-Cultures
There are many ethical theories that think of right and wrong in terms of what consequences the general adoption of moral principles would have. Contractualists think of what consequences the principles would have for individual lives; rule-consequentialists think of what...
Posted Feb 16, 2013 at
Philosophers at the Leveson Inquiry
All of you are of course aware that here in the UK there has been huge phone hacking scandal. This scandal lead to the Leveson Inquiry on Culture, Practice, and Ethics of Press. Last week, on Monday 16th of July,...
Posted Jul 25, 2012 at
Intrinsic Value and Ramseyan Humility
Moore, of course, thought that intrinsic value is the central evaluative property. Admittedly, specifying what counts as an intrinsic property is an interesting and difficult question in itself. Let me offer just a quick sketch. On this proposal, whether an...
Posted Jun 13, 2012 at
Eric, thanks a lot for these critical thoughts on my book review. I often wonder if anyone really carefully reads book reviews, and so it was wonderful to see this kind of thoughtful critical reaction. Just few points corresponding to your points: 1. Note that in the Gallery example you are asked to describe your visual sensations. I assume that feelings and emotions are not such. But, I'm happy to think of emotions as modes of representations that usually too are directed outwards. Moods are perhaps trickier. 2. I think here you might be using transparency in another sense. In that sense, transparency means that you are immediately right about what your attitudes are. The indirect method I am inclined towards where you find out about your attitudes by thinking about the external world does not entail anything like that. I agree that we often require others. Self-deception is probably fairly common. But that too is a glass through which we look at the world outwards. But, you might be right that transparency is a self-deception for me. I've been very influenced by people like Simon Blackburn and Richard Moran on this (you can find similar thoughts from Sartre too). 3. I'd like to hear more about the modern advertising thought. It seems to me that those kinds of mechanisms work unconsciously whereas I was thinking of practical reasoning from the internal phenomenological perspective. Kekes says that he is explicitly trying to capture the latter. On the other hand, if one explicitly thinks that I'll buy this because it makes me look cool as the advert says then it seems like I am again thinking about the external features in the world.
Commented Jan 20, 2011 on
New APPS: Art, Politics, Philosophy, Science
This review of John Kekes' The Human Condition by Jussi Suikkanen has a disarming quality to it. "The upshot of this difference between our practical perspectives is that either Kekes fails to capture the human condition from the properly internal perspective, or I'm failing to function as a hu...
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