If you do not subscribe to Phillips' Newsletter on Substack, consider doing so. Phillips P. O'Brien, a professor of strategic studies at the University of Saint Andrews, therein covers mostly the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, and with more insight than most. I specifically endorse his latest short section of an essay (7 July 2024), "The Intellectual Poverty of Realism," in response to an open letter by 61 mostly academics, publicized by Politico (3 July 2024), on why Ukraine should not be in NATO. Phillips concludes that Ultimately this is a letter written to justify earlier failures of the authors. It should be treated with the contempt it deserves. I know quite a few of the authors personally. I might be more generous than Phillips. I will merely call their efforts misguided. However, I do fully agree with Phillips' analysis of the twisted logic in the letter. Putin and his cabal would not be more likely to engage in other war if Ukraine were a member state in NATO. Putinists are terrified by the prospect of fighting the full force of the Atlantic Alliance. They are also horrified by the prospects of defeat by Ukraine. Those factors are respectively the mortar and... Continue reading

My latest research, published by the Atlantic Council, investigates the outcomes over the past 30 years when the U.S. military has bought off-the-shelf gear proven in service with allied forces. While the instances are uncommon, the results are consistent: U.S forces get quality kit, at reasonable costs, mostly on time. Of course, that's an expected result, which begs the question--why haven't the procurement bureaucrats learned this lesson yet? Perhaps they should read the paper. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/friend-sourcing-military-procurement/ Continue reading

The Center for European Policy Analysis has just published my essay below in Europe's Edge, CEPA’s online journal "covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America." This particular essay was part of CEPA’s Age of Autonomy series, which looks at the growing use and implementation of autonomous technologies on the battlefield and its implications for transatlantic defense and security. As always, all opinions are those of the author, etc., and as follows... ----- Economy, Autonomy, and Rethinking the Military https://cepa.org/article/economy-autonomy-and-rethinking-the-military/ The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war has shown how challenges in demography and geography pose serious problems for NATO’s security. At the same time, new and established enterprises in industry are providing precise, inexpensive, and lethal technologies to compensate. Preparing for the next war means embracing the mass application of autonomous systems that are comparatively easy to engineer, produce, and employ. Fielding such forces, however, will require profound changes in military procurement, logistics, organization, and the very people they recruit, train, and retain. Demography and geography are conspiring against security. Ukrainian troops are fighting with difficulty against Russia’s capabilities in surveillance, firepower, and field engineering. Despite their continuous stream of tactical successes, Ukrainian missiles and mechanized assaults... Continue reading

The AUSA exposition, underway this week in Washington DC, is one of the most important arms shows of the year. I was delighted to see a full force of Israeli firms showcasing kit, after the psychotic attack on their country. I salute those who came, and those who fight. Their war will be difficult, but the correlation of forces, the geography, and the essentiality of the struggle strongly favor a decisive Israeli victory. Even so, Hamas is filled with murderous fanatics who will fight hard. I will be closely watching the relative performances as the Israeli Army attacks, and I will aim to learn much about the comparative importance of infantry, artillery, armor, aviation, and other arms in urban combat. Just as the Russo-Ukrainian War has brought many lessons for sparse battlefields, the Gaza War should reveal many for denser ones. Download my full-page, full-bore research report here: Download On the Gaza War 20231010. Until my next update, Slava Ukraini and Am Yisael Chai. Continue reading

My long research note of 25 August, “On Learning Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War,” analyzed the debate on how much seems to have changed of late about the character of warfare. For the military, at least two things differ: drones and data. I now extend that analysis to industry, where the issue includes customary rates of development and production. In today’s Wall Street Journal, Yaroslav Trofimov brings two quotes from top military management that encapsulate the dichotomous learning problem: Nothing stands firm. War is the time when technology develops. Every operation is different, and if you repeat it the same way, it would make no sense because the enemy already has an antidote. — Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa, commander of the Ukrainian Navy We have a lot of lessons to learn. One is that quantity is a quality of its own. You need numbers, you need force numbers. In the West we have reduced our military, we have reduced our stocks. But quantity matters, mass matters. — Major General Christian Freuding, the head of Ukraine operations at the German Ministry of Defense In short, we will need new stuff, constantly, and a lot of it. So how well is this... Continue reading

American security assistance has long resisted substantially on training and weapons. The training does not always stick, and for Ukrainians more recently, the advice has been unhelpful. The weapons are mostly highly valued, in comparison to those of Russia and China, though not always well suited to local conditions. After reading Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds’ latest report at RUSI, I offer two ideas for moving security assistance from advice and hardware to services and software. For my full-page, full-bore analysis, Download Security assistance services and software 20230925. Continue reading

I disagree with Josh Rogin’s editorial, in yesterday’s Washington Post, that “Ukraine aid is hanging by a thread.” In contrast, I agree with Byron Callan of Capital Alpha Partners for his observation, in a research note of yesterday, that money and munitions will continue flowing to support the war in the east, “because a majority in DC recognizes the consequences of a Ukrainian defeat for Asia and Europe.” Whatever the fulminations of what Congressman Don Bacon of Nebraska has termed “the dysfunction caucus”, there are far better costs to cut, including in the Defense Department’s budget. Thus, as Callan continues in a research note of earlier today, the current war will remain contest of industries, at which the Russians will struggle in the long run. As Pavel Baev wrote this week, “the old Soviet stocks are exhausted, and current production rates are insufficient.” I will continue with a further thought. The next big war may be yet more a contest of militaries, and before it starts. Mobilizing old-school munitions production may not suffice. Forces across and beyond NATO need to get more comfortable with unmanned systems, and the marketing arms of the arms industry have a role to play in... Continue reading

September has seemed a pivotal month in the conduct of modern warfare, even if we just focus on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. In considering the score of the past two weeks, note that all the Ukrainian work to secure the Black Sea against Russian naval activity has been undertaken without access to a single large ship. The Russians have lost a submarine, but only in port. For many navies, this begs the question, when does a navy actually require surface ships? What radical change would that suggest? In my seven-page note, I analyze that question through the framework of what Elon Musk calls his “algorithm” for breakthrough performance improvement. Download On Winning at Sea without Ships 20230919. Continue reading

The recent crash of a Russian warlord’s airplane is a reminder of the ubiquity of overhead surveillance: American intelligence thinks that the cause must have been an onboard bomb, because no missile launch was detected near Moscow. The full scope of that sort of overhead surveillance has enabled a Ukrainian style of warfare that relies heavily on highly dispersed, mobile infantry splendidly equipped with precision robotics. The Pentagon’s Replicator Initiative aims to duplicate some of that for the Americans, though perhaps with more robust and survivable weapons. Reforming fighting forces like 21st-century “Jock Columns” demands precision technology en masse, which suggests quicker program starts, faster learning curves, a shift in comparative advantage in military contracting, and less enthusiasm for horizontal mergers. Read my four-page analysis here: Download On Fighting Ukrainian Style 20230829. Continue reading

Anonymous opinions about the situation in the Russo-Ukrainian War have been characterizing the military situation as stalemated. I assess that this whisper campaign is more designed to justify political decisions by the Biden Administration than to assess both the tactical situation and the broader technological dynamics of modern warfare. A more honest debate about what is possible and plausible in modern warfare, underway for several years, has been greatly informed by feedback from the front. Many 20th-century military systems are showing obsolescence because 21st-century surveillance and strike systems have been limiting their battlefield potential, inflicting high losses for little countervailing value. This in turn has been exposing the high costs and long production lead-times of the old-and-obvious. The question for technologists and industrialists is whether the strategists will learn the relevant lessons, and how soon. The 21st century will unfold more slowly than some pundits predict, but more quickly than conservative military sentiments will allow. Fixing that problem will require vigorous marketing, and judicious timing in scaling manufacturing. Corporate alliances between emerging and established firms continue to offer an excellent way to solve that problem, and sometimes as far forward as Ukraine. My full seven-page analysis is available here: Download... Continue reading

As the Ukrainian defense minister recently lamented, “Ukraine is the most heavily mined country in the world.” While his not-quite 6,000 sappers are hard at work scratching paths through Russian lines, actually clearing the country of explosives could take twenty years at its present pace. Few systematic solutions have emerged “left-of-boom,” beyond hand-held metal detectors and Bangalore torpedos, developed during the First World War. My research describes how matching better solutions to the problem requires providing policymakers with windows of opportunity for making the right decisions, which open lamentably infrequently. I offer two other ideas for advancing the cause against landmines: criminalizing the mining of another country’s territory, and a prize competition for a truly automated approach for detection and destruction. My five-page analysis and policy proposal is available here: Download On Landmines 20230814. Continue reading

Analysis of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War continues to suggest answers to what matters most in warfare. As my friend Byron Callan likes to say, wars are audits; and to paraphrase Leon Trotsky, from time to time, another war gets interested in us. Militaries and their supporting industries should thus always want to know what inputs best predict victory. Then, in pursuit of a reasonable return and efficient processes, we should ask ask what industrial factors matter most for supporting that victory. To answer this question, I update an assessment I began in 2013 with new evidence from the Russo-Ukrainian War. I consider three possibilities in the literature, and offer three ideas about what to do: If technology matters most, then manufacturers have strong arguments for new weapons—and new skills too. If skill matters most, then the training & simulation industry has the best argument. If learning matters most, then agility is an essential corporate quality for wartime contracting. If indeed (3) is true, then, every arms manufacturer and military software developer with the financial means should have a team on the ground somewhere in Ukraine trying to learn what’s being learned, and critically, how to learn. My four-page analysis is... Continue reading

Just this month, new merger guidelines emerged from the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission, and to some alarm. As Elizabeth Nolan Brown wrote for Reason magazine immediately thereafter, the hint therein seemed to be “Maybe Just Don't Merge Anything at All.” In thinking about how this new articulation of old-is-new-again policy might affect investors and industrialists in military contracting, I have formulated four points: The new merger guidelines seem severe, but may not greatly matter with large contractors. Horizontal mergers amongst large military contractors have been effectively forbidden for at least a decade, even if, as I will note below, they may not be so pernicious in those markets. Vertical mergers have come under serious scrutiny, which is why Lockheed Martin’s attempted purchase of engine supplier Aerojet Rocketdyne was disallowed. Conglomerate mergers have merely been attracting concern, which is why the entirely unrelated firm L3Harris was allowed to buy Aerojet Rocketdyne. The new guidelines do not say too much about conglomerate mergers, so the overall effect may be muted. High-quality startups need prices and pathways—including options for merger. The problem may lie with startups, if enthusiasm for antitrust enforcement turns in that direction. Startups in any industry have... Continue reading

“Submarines Will Reign in a War with China”. So did Mike Sweeney of George Mason University entitle his recent prize-winning essay in Naval Institute Proceedings. That may be true, but reigning over the seas will require actual submarines. The US Navy has well fewer than the inventory thought needed for a war over Taiwan, and the Chinese Navy has been built for that war. This problem presents four alternatives for naval strategists: Increasing the building rate of Virginia-class submarines. This is infeasible in the short run, and questionably so in the long run. Increasing the repair rate for Los Angeles-class submarines. This is possible in the short run, but pointless in the long run. Shifting attack submarines to where they are more needed. The Navy has limited latitude to move submarines from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Building lots of small robotic submarines. While this is technologically uncertain, it is industrially far more feasible. The choice pivots strategically on the timeframe of expected aggression from the Chinese regime. If we expect that an attack in the next few years, then repairing old Los Angeles-class submarines may be of some utility. If the attack is more than ten years away, then... Continue reading

A series of essays over the past few weeks, from leading technologists and industrialists, have led me to four points about the meaning of software in modern warfare: Software has been eating the world, and as the Russo-Ukrainian War shows, it is now eating the war. Software is different, and military bureaucracies in much of the world are still struggling with that reality. The Ukrainians now know military software like no one else in the world. In the long run, the Ukrainians will rule much of this business, so industry in North American and the rest of Europe should start working with them now. The two easy answers are to open an office in Kyiv, but for now, to focus on non-kinetic applications. Download my full six-page analysis at the link: Download On Investing in Ukrainian Software 20230712. Continue reading

Across the Atlantic alliance, and indeed in most industrialized countries, demography is producing long-term disaster for the military. In many of those countries, questionable human capital management is exacerbating the problem. I suggest a four-fold response: greater reliance on reserves, increased use of battlefield and rear-area robotics, rethinking strategies for more valuable utilization of people, and refinancing contracting by leveraging investments in labor-extending technologies. My full seven-page analysis is available here: Download On the Military Demography & Human Capital 20230706. Continue reading

Multiple challenges demand that allied military forces embrace a host of emerging technologies for radically expanded autonomy in weaponry. I have five points: Economy. The competing Russian and Ukrainian ways of war are again revealing the compelling case for precision in all weapon systems. Geography. In the future, against modern surveillance and strike technologies, allied forces will fight with difficulty through even thin opposing lines, and at great distances, with their logistics constantly under attack. Demography. Very low birth rates in almost every allied country will provide fewer forces for defense and counter-attack against smash-and-grab autocrats. Maneuver under modern conditions may be very difficult, but still necessary. Technology. All this means that future wars will thus require substituting capital for labor: collaborative, loitering, self-guided weapons with heterogenous payloads accompanying all the troops. This requires rediscovering and updating the old American Way of War: industrial-scale attrition, with information-age technologies. Industry. Development and production of weapons with these technologies may require upstart firms and collaborative alliances. Building precision with mass will certainly mean more production capacity. Investments are flowing, and with a strong demand signal. Firms mentioned in this note include Adarga, Anduril and its acquisition Adranos, BAE Systems Bofors, General Dynamics,... Continue reading

After the events of the past week, I update my ongoing analysis of the conduct of the Russo-Ukrainian War. I upwardly revise my assessment of war termination in the next six months from highly unlikely to merely unlikely. I have four points: The “Joyride of the Valkyries” undertaken by the Wagner Group has revealed a complete lack of Russian military reserves. This increases the likelihood of a dramatic Ukrainian exploitation, if Ukrainian forces can penetrate Russian defensive lines. Industry outside Ukraine continues to learn from Ukrainian experience, slowly. Investors should expect investment horizons supported by long-term Russian hostility. I also offer some insights from this week’s Land Warfare Conference at the Royal United Services Institute in London. I will continue to update my analysis as events warrant. Download my full four-page analysis at the link below: Download On the Russo-Ukrainian War 20230627 Continue reading

News flow from this week’s Paris Air Show, and my ongoing research and analysis, lead me to four main points about drones: Mounting combat experience indicates that military spending on unmanned aircraft will increase sharply. The diversity of drone builders showcased indicates an ongoing Hyundaization of the military aircraft industry. Policy-makers should realize that wartime mobilization will necessarily favor unmanned over manned aircraft, because the latter cannot be built quickly. Investors and industrialists should anticipate that even without a big war, the rise of drone makers may quicken. Firms mentioned in this report include Atlas (Latvia), Baykar, Boeing, Elbit, Eurofighter GmbH, General Atomics, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, MBDA, Northrop Grumman, Saab, Sierra Nevada, Tekever (Portugal), Turgis & Gaillard (France), and Ukroboronprom. Download my full eight-page analysis through the link below: Download On Drones and the Paris Air Show 20230623 Continue reading

Developments over the past few weeks have reinforced my views about the future of battlefield air support. I have four points: The Russian Army’s helicopter force continues to suffer high casualty rates in Ukraine, which indicates that direct attack against sophisticated air defenses is very challenging. However, recent reinforcement of the helicopter force in Berdyansk, mostly out of Ukrainian missile range, with its own standoff missiles, indicates that the Russian Army is learning from past failures. The Italian Army has already pursued this standoff weapons approach, and the US Army is close behind. However, a full analysis of alternatives for the US Army’s Future Attack and Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) could produce a very different result than presumed. The result is that technologists, industrialists, and investors should consider a future in which tilt-rotors are more important to combat aviation than conventional helicopters, and perhaps other types of aircraft as well. Firms mentioned in this report include Bell, Boeing, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Rafael, Russian Helicopters, Sikorsky, and Thales. Download my full four-page analysis through the link below: Download Further thoughts on battlefield rotorcraft 20230620 Continue reading

I have been analyzing the record of the past year-and-a-half of military aviation in the Russo-Ukrainian War, including operational threats, technological and geopolitical trends, and economic realities. I offer two important points, and a set of industrial predictions, regarding aircraft and missiles: The power of air defenses on both sides explains why manned aviation remains a minor contributor in the Russo-Ukrainian War. The power of precision weapons against aircraft on the ground indicates that manned aviation may be a lesser contributor in a future war against China. Long-term demand will trend away from the F-35, towards the B-21 and the LRASM, and generally towards ground-based precision weapons. Companies mentioned in this analysis include Aero Vodochody, Israel Aircraft Industries, Lockheed Martin, MBDA, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and Saab. Download my six-page research note through the link below. Comments by e-mail ([email protected]) are most welcome. Download Long-term views on airpower 20230616 Continue reading

I explore the question of whether we can predict the nature and timing of military innovation through Cohen, March, and Olsen’s classic (1972) model of the “organized anarchy” of bureaucratic decision-making. I extend their model by leafing into their variables known factors of military innovation found in the literature. I consider how Military problems (needs) have political, bureaucratic and financial aspects. Innovative solutions have technological, doctrinal, organizational, industrial, and financial aspects. Decision-makers match those solutions to their problems, but only through implementing military bureaucracies. The windows of opportunity for innovative choices can be fleeting. Post-war recoveries, arms-control treaties, reorganizations, changes in legislators and leaders, and budgetary cycles all provide openings for change. I conclude that such a framework, implemented in a mathematical model, may help both predict and explain how and when military innovations occurs. Required next is a great deal of reading and variable-coding, and some modest degree of mathematical modeling. I will develop this into a research project as resources are available. For now, download my nine-page working paper through the link below. Comments by e-mail ([email protected]) are most welcome. Download On Predicting Military Innovation 20230608 Continue reading

With this note, I am beginning an ongoing analysis on unmanned ships in naval warfare. After the latest Ukrainian drone-boat attack, I offer five points: Last month’s attack on the Russian signals intelligence ship Ivan Khurs, 200 miles from the nearest Ukrainian-controlled shore, signals a sea-change in sea-surface warfare. The Russian reaction may be to greatly scale back surface ship plans—and other navies may begin following suit. American plans for surface drones are not yet displacing other programs, but they are growing in scope and size. Industry can support change agents in the naval bureaucracy with two highly consequential technological development efforts: towards more sophisticated on-board decision-making, and much greater equipment reliability at sea. Small, robotic ships will also be very helpful for wartime mobilization, as they offset China’s huge advantage in shipbuilding capacity. Companies mentioned in this report include IBM, Incat Crowther, L3 Harris, Leidos (including Gibbs & Cox), Saildrone, Swiftships, Vigor Industrial, United States Marine Inc. I will update this analysis as events warrant. Download my full six-page analysis through the link below: Download On Unmanned Ships 20230604 Continue reading

I have been considering the role of rotorcraft in modern warfare, and particularly in the conduct of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. For technologists, industrialists, and investors, I offer three points: Loitering above a battlefield, or on an airfield, is so dangerous that most military aviation must eventually become fleeting and field-independent. Rotary- and fixed-wing combat aircraft are somewhat fungible, as both attack and scout machines. The experience of the Russo-Ukrainian War suggests future demand for rotorcraft with standoff precision weapons. Industry needs battlefield demonstrations and a long-term marketing effort to encourage acceptance of a conclusive shift from fixed- to rotary-wing emphasis in battlefield air support. I will update this analysis as events warrant. Download my full six-page analysis through the link below: Download On Rotorcraft 20230526 Continue reading

I have four points on the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in modern military affairs, and what investors, industrialists, and technologists can do about it: Selective use of AI at present points to broader applications emerging in at least five areas: target recognition, predictive intelligence and operational recommendations, resilience in command and control, increasing the autonomy of robotic systems, and labor-enhancing human-machine teaming. Policy and professional angst are indeed restraining progress. However, dire predictions that the US is behind may not be serious. The big question for everything else in the military is simple: what can AI do for a platform do that it cannot do for a payload? I will update this analysis as events warrant. Download my full six-page analysis through the link below: Download On Artificial Intelligence 20230522 Continue reading