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Christy M.
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Sorry to arrive late to the party, but isn't this all a debate about the permissibility of leveraging? That is, when is it permissible for B to G so as to leverage A to F? If so, then the following looks to hold: 1) Assuming (for A) F-ing (or ~F-ing) to be morally permissible, if (for B) G-ing itself is morally permissible, then it is morally permissible for B to G so as to leverage A to F (or ~F). 2) Assuming (for A) F-ing to be morally obligatory (and ~F-ing to be morally impermissible), then if (for B) G-ing itself is morally permissible, then it is at least morally permissible for B to G so as to leverage A to F (and morally impermissible for B to G so as to leverage A to ~F). This goes both ways: that is, the same applies to being leveraged as to leveraging. For example, suppose it is supererogatory for anyone to give money to UNICEF. Alf decides to make a one time donation of 5 dollars. Betty tells Alf that if he doesn't donate any money to UNICEF, then she'll donate 10 dollars to UNICEF. If it is the case that donating or not donating money to UNICEF is morally permissible, then it cannot be the case either that a) it is morally impermissible for B to donate money so as to leverage A to not donate money or that b) it is morally obligatory for A not to donate money in virtue of being leverage by B donating money. So, even were we to suppose that Betty tells Alf that if he doesn't donate money to UNICEF, then she'll donate 10 billion dollars to UNICEF, unless some additional threshold argument is made, Alf no more has an obligation not to donate his 5 dollars than he did prior to Betty's leveraging. You cannot generate an obligation or prohibition merely in virtue of morally permissible leveraging. So, it looks like if A ~F-ing is morally permissible and B G-ing is morally permissible, then B G-ing so as to leverage A to ~F is likewise morally permissible. Given that the supererogatory is a subspecies of the morally permissible, whether or not for A F is supererogatory doesn't matter at all for the permissibility of B leveraging A to ~ F. Intuitions to the contrary I think result from the supererogation of A F-ing functioning in Jason's (and others') examples as an illicit intuition pump.