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Nick Beckstead
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Doug, The first answer involving (1) and (2) did not attempt to specify a use of "ought" corresponding to an H1 theory. It was aimed at specifying a reason that theoretically inclined philosophers would have for giving certain advice. They could specify a theory of value and a rational response to value. And they could say how to respond if you knew more. Given the skills of a theoretically inclined philosopher, this strikes me as a reasonable division of labor between the factual and the normative. On this proposal, we give people an H1 theory and let them fill in the other factual details as they see fit. It isn't our job to fill in the factual details. If, for some reason, it was especially easy to fill in the details or we had all of the other factual answers, then we wouldn't have any reason to just say, “maximize expected aggregate utility.” (I don't know if I accept this story, but I confess it's the best thing that I can think of right now.) I take this to be the same reason that an economist advocating a particular model or risk management under uncertainty doesn't say anything about how to manage risk if your uncertain about the acceptability of his model. Now, some comments that you've made suggest to me that you think that subjective rightness should play a certain role with respect to judgments about blame. You aren't going to get that from the story I'm advocating. (But, I don't think that that would be an especially good story about blame for a utilitarian to accept anyway.)
Here are some more explanations of the attraction of H1 theories. (1) The task of moral philosophy is to tell us what ends we should have. (2) The task of the theory of rationality is to tell us how our ends ought to be pursued. Consequentialists might accept (1) and (2), thinking that the best answer to (1) is the utilitarian theory of value and that the best answer to (2) is Bayesian decision theory. If you put these together, you get an H1 theory. Solving (1) and (2) is part of one's task as a philosopher; discovering all the facts about human psychology/climates/health care/etc. that might be relevant to decision making is not a task that philosophers could expect to do better than others. True, there are applied ethicists who have other things to say. But that theoretically inclined philosophers only go this far is part of a reasonable division of labor. A second rationale. We want to say what the very best conclusion about what to do would be if you had to reach it from the armchair. The very best answer would incorporate (1) and (2), and it would be that you should maximize expected utility. Someone already said this, so I won't say much about it. (A wrinkle. We might wonder about whether there are further epistemic constraints that you can figure out from the armchair or would be part of what philosophers could do well to contribute. If there are, we may wish to add them in. The answer might then take the form of maximize expected utility on a certain probability function given your total evidence.) Finally, PS theories, if they're any good, might be unstable as well. A PS theory that doesn't just tell you to do what you ultimately think you should do is probably going to have a Bayesian element. But if it has one, it might be too epistemically demanding due to familiar issues of logical omniscience and such. And this kind of epistemic demandingness might be objectionable for the very reason that it is objectionable that agents should have to act in accordance with the correct moral theory. So there might not be a good PS theory to turn to. (I say this being unfamiliar with the work of Zimmerman, Sepielli, and others. Perhaps they have solutions to this that show worry to be unfounded.) Even if your answer has no Bayesian element, I suspect that if it has any substantive advice to give at all, there will be situations in which it is too difficult to apply in practice. This is a familiar issue raised by the decision procedure/criterion of rightness distinction. At any rate, my suspicion is that there will be a trade-off between substantiveness and ease of application. H1-type answers do not strike me as a bad way to make the trade-off, especially if we remember the difference between criteria of rightness and decision procedures.