Alice MacLachlan (2013) says that an apology should do, at least, the following three things: (i) identify the wrong, the wrongdoer, and the victim; (ii) disavow the act as wrongful/take responsibility; and (iii) express a commitment to some form of repair. An apology that falls short on any of these criteria is prima facie inadequate. But MacLachlan also recognises that structural inequalities can affect the acceptability and credibility of an apology. Apologies, she notes, “take place in social spaces, marked by various asymmetries of social and political power, and thus vary widely in their expressions of power” (2013b: 11). Apologies can be used strategically to silence an oppressed person or group, burnish an oppressor’s reputation, facilitate reconciliation without remediation, and accomplish other nefarious ends. Apologies are also perceived differently depending on the social identities of the apologiser(s) and the recipient(s). These contextual factors are all relevant to the acceptability of an apology. An adequate apology should not only meet conditions (i)-(iii), but should disrupt inequalities of power, not reinforce them. (You will see similarities here between MacLachlan’s contextual approach and my own in “An Intersectional Feminist Theory of Moral Responsibility.” Her view, like mine, is what I would describe as ameliorative). MacLachlan, A. (2013). Government apologies to indigenous peoples. In Justice, Responsibility and Reconciliation in the Wake of Conflict (pp. 183-203). Springer, Dordrecht. MacLachlan, A. (2013b). Gender and public apology. Transitional Justice Review, 1(2), 126-147.