Hi Taylor. I'm so sorry, I cannot make this meeting. I'm recovering from a recent illness. I will read the paper and comment before the end of the month though!

Mikayla, thanks so much for your comments! Let me just offer some brief responses: Re (1): Actually what you've articulated here is basically my view. Any reasonable standard must be such that there are things which nobody sufficiently like us (e.g. nobody to which the standard applies) could possibly believe. This is true of non-moral beliefs (e.g. the Earth is flat is not a reasonable belief for someone sufficiently like us, and if your standard allows that it is then there's something wrong with your standard). My claim is that this is true of moral beliefs as well - so yes there will be beliefs (like JoJo's belief that torturing innocent citizens on a whim is permissible) that are just not going to be reasonable for anyone sufficiently like us - so if your standard allows it to count as reasonable something is wrong with your standard. So I think my account largely agrees with you. Re (2): Well, I really don't know what to make of the claim that there are 'moral reasons to believe' that are not also just epistemic reasons. Is the thought that it might do moral harm if I discover the truth so there is a moral reason not to believe X but epistemic reasons to believe it? I know people make such a claim but I admit I have trouble understanding it. Most of the time the reasons speaking against "believing X" tend to be reasons to avoid looking into X, not reasons that speak directly against the belief itself - so, suppose a very loyal and loving Mother's son is in trouble and being tried for murder. He tells her that he didn't do it and begs her to believe him. It might be that she is morally motivated to believe him and so she does. But this moral reason to believe him is just a reason not to look into it any further, e.g. it's a moral reason not to gather more evidence because one's moral commitment dictates that his word is good enough. I don't know what to say about such cases, but I think pragmatic encroachment is true so I'm happy to admit that how much evidence one is required to gather depends deeply on one's contexts and commitments, so we can build that right into the reasonable standard. Does this answer your question? Re (3): I don't claim that it is impossible for someone sufficiently like us to come to a reasonable but false moral belief. Indeed, I claim the opposite. I is totally possible. One of either James and Jane has exactly that: a reasonably held but false moral belief! Did that not come through?

Adam: Right, I think 4 is the upper limit and I would also suggest that 2 of them be reserved for the two talks. And, of course, I doubt every one of us will be able to read and comment on every single paper every month. The idea, as I understand it, is that hopefully at least a few will have the time to get substantial comments and others will be able to get some quick thoughts in. Alessandro: you should have received a link to create a typad account for the site that will give you access to create a post. When you create a new post you can upload a file for people to download and comment upon. I think that's best since a full paper length post would be a bit too difficult to commen on (for me anyway).