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I'm not sure how you got the URL's for your links, but they're all screwed up. Here's an example of one that should work (works for me, anyway): Yours had a whole bunch of stuff from other searches, also has lpg=PA12 instead of pg=PA17. I changed to because the blog post is in English, so I guess you want the page you point to be in English.
Note that, as you can tell from the URL Eric links to, there is also a newer version of my neglected paper:
The main point here is not to distinguish between Plato and the historical Socrates, but distinguish between Plato and the character Socrates, as well as: between what the character Socrates says and what he does. Admitting or claiming that the Stoics "disagree with Plato" over Socrates does nothing to help with those distinctions.
In a century, Analytic philosophy has generated plenty of figures who ought to be central to "M&E" as well as to "value" — that is, more properly, to theoretical as well to practical philosophy. For example: Stanley Cavell. For another example: David Lewis! The fruit has been picked, but there is no stomach to digest it.
This is admirable, but he might want to consider first some steps to address similar concerns of a more urgent nature. For example: (1) turn down (the possibility of) getting published in ("top") journals; (2) turn down (the possibility of) getting his undergraduates admitted to ("good") graduate programs and his graduate students hired by ("good") departments; (3) turn down (the possibility) of getting his program a better Leiter rank; (4) turn down (the possibility of) receiving pay for teaching philosophy; (5) live in a barrel, masturbate in public, and, if Alexander the Great comes by and asks what he can do for him, reply: "get out of my sun."
Another part that needs answering is: Carnap’s “principle of tolerance” was an invitation to triviality. As Russell put it, “God exists,” “God doesn’t exist” — no problem for Carnap, just different languages. For Carnap, as for Heidegger, the problem of how we shall speak is the problem of how we shall be. No problem is less trivial for him. To mistake such a problem for a theoretical question which can be answered using such "the tools of the a priori," is, from Carnap's point of view, precisely to trivialize it, if not worse. And while we're on the subject of those tools: I agree with Descartes and Kant, among many others, that the philosophical a priori is other than the mathematical. Other and more difficult, perhaps even impossible. Nevertheless, what Glymour says about "intuitions" is exactly right, and he's right, too, to say that we should expect philosophers to know something about mathematics and programing (but we should expect them to know other things, too, e.g. Greek).
It's amazing how much of what he says seems right on the mark to me, and yet how wrong the overall moral. Leaving aside the thing about Continental philosophy (which is silly as written but, if anything, underestimates the magnitude of the problem posed by Heidegger's politics): the idea that philosophy's roll is to patrol science for "hidden presuppositions, equivocations, bad arguments generally" or to free it from "disciplinary blinkers" strikes me as a dead end. Scientists tend to think and argue in a way which looks wrong, not only to philosophers, but even to mathematicians. But while mathematicians are free to rant and rave about that (and to be forever surprised when all the scientists' dumb error cancel each other out in the end), the duty of philosophy is to understand it.
Also, although this kind of structure can sometimes be traced de facto to philosophy (for example, the concept of mass originated in attempts to explain thermal expansion of the consecrated host), but I don't think philosophy has a de juris role in that respect. The gist of my points 8 and 11 is that physical science exposes such structure to empirical test. As you may recall, I agree with Popper to this extent, that the rational status of scientific theory derives from its testability.
Without having read all of the above, I just want to say: I haven't read Arntzenius and Dorr and I actually doubt that whatever new structure they introduce (if any) is empirically justified. I'm not defending them; just responding to Azzouni's reasons for attacking them.
I haven't read this all carefully yet, but: seemingly the best standard of comparison for a 12th c. Indian text would be someone like Avicenna or maybe Al-Jāḥiẓ, rather than Aristotle?
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Oct 26, 2010