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Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia
Mexico City
Recent Activity
having a sharp image of X is not seeing X in a different way that having a blurry image of it, but seeing facts about X (i.e. X seeing X as having certain determinate properties) that X objectively has that you would miss when your view of X is blurrier. Continue reading
Posted Aug 22, 2019 at Philosophical Percolations
In (2017), Starmans, Sheskin and Bloom claim “that when people are asked about the ideal distribution of wealth in their country, they actually prefer unequal societies” (Starmans, Sheskin and Bloom 2007, 1) and refer to five studies as evidence:(Norton and Ariely 2011), (Arsenio, Preziosi, Silberstein & Hamburger 2013), (Norton, et al. 2014), (Kiatpongsan and Nortonshowed 2014). However, none of the aforementioned studies give much support to Starmans, Sheskin and Bloom’s assertion: Continue reading
Posted Jun 14, 2019 at Philosophical Percolations
The overall general strategy in both cases is to argue that without numbers, it would be very hard to explain why things that we accept to be true – or at least, to be successful as claims about the world, like simple arithmetical truths like seventeen being prime, complex physical laws like the superposition principle or just everyday assertions like there being twelve judges in the Supreme Court – are actually true. The basic idea is that something cannot be true unless the things it is about actually exist. Thus, if we know what something is true and that it is about some category of things, then we have good reasons to conclude that such things do exist. Continue reading
Posted Apr 22, 2019 at Philosophical Percolations
Thank you do much for your comments Moira! (a) Yeah, I battled a lot about whether this applies only to certain departments or not. In the end, I preferred applying it t across the board, but reduce its value to only one point. This whole second section on one point elements was very much in response to this sort of concerns: http://theroughground.blogspot.com/2015/01/chalmers-pictures.html [Disclaimer, I appear in at least one of Chalmer's photos, and have had drinks with him on several occasions] (b) I completely agree and that is why I added "contact with philosophers from the Hispanic world" which, you are completely right, might contribute more to inclusivity that including scholarship from Latinx studies in the USA.
We do not feel ashamed of being weak or a failure, but in being judged as weak or a failure. As a matter of fact, the very notions of ‘weak’, ‘a failure’ or anything we might think would be something we might feel ashamed of being is always judgment-dependent in the sense that even though it might denote an objective feature of us – our strength, appearance, material status, etc. – its extension is still fixed by appeal to social standards or, at least, the subjective standards of others. Continue reading
Posted Oct 24, 2018 at Philosophical Percolations
If we wanted to precisify the edge of the hill, we could end up with a line like this, but this does not mean that this line could or might be the edge of the hill. There is some sort of modality involved in precification thus understood, but this is not the usual alethic, epistemic or deontic modalities that you think; it must be a sui-generis sort of modality. Continue reading
Posted Sep 7, 2018 at Philosophical Percolations
A post shared by Axel Arturo Barceló (@barcelo.axel) on Apr 26, 2018 at 7:20am PDT by Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia Many political and philosophical approaches to the ontology of social categories stress their social and ethnic aspects. According to these socio-ethnic accounts what makes someone belong to a given category... Continue reading
Posted May 2, 2018 at Philosophical Percolations
The key point of these proposals is to argue that the property in question P is not actually a property that an object of the proper kind either has or has not, but rather a gradual property that can only be had to some degree or other. This means that, between things that are P and those that are not-P, there are intermediate cases that are neither P nor not-P. Continue reading
Posted Mar 26, 2018 at Philosophical Percolations
The first, and perhaps most radical solution to conflicting evidence is to accept the ensuing contradiction, not as a problem to solve, but as a feature of the phenomenon. The basic idea is that, since both the evidence for and against A being P must be accepted as equally good, then what it shows is that, for the particular case of A and P, it must be true true that A its both P and not P. That this sort of solution is not absurd has been productively explored by philosophers and logicians like Graham Priest (1985) or JC Beall (2009), among others. This solution is usually accompanied by a proposal to change the underlying logic to a paraconsistent logic to allow this kind of contradictions. The main feature of these logics that makes them fit for dialetheism is that they help us distinguish between exploding and non-exploding contradictions, that is, contradictions that entail everything and, therefore, make any theory that contains them collapse into absurdity, and contradictions that do not and, therefore, can be incorporated into a theory without catastrophic consequences. Continue reading
Posted Nov 6, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
...realistic pictures, and other depictions. This sort of pictures hold a middle ground between symbols like words and signals like footprints. Like symbols, they represent what they represent by an artificial and intentional act – the act of artificially reproducing the visual appearance of its object –, but like signals they relay on something that is naturally linked to what they depict – the appearance they reproduce. Continue reading
Posted Oct 26, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
Delusions are not rational in the externalist sense of being the product of a well-functioning reliable cognitive system. On the contrary, there is ample evidence that some cognitive malfunctions are involved. Furthermore, they are not rational in an internalist, deontological sense either, since this sort of rationality requires the agent to have a well-functioning conscious, control system (corresponding to S1 in dual system theory), and delusional agents’ conscious control systems are too tied to the false and recalcitrant delusional belief. Continue reading
Posted Oct 13, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
True propositions of the form ‘P follows from Q’ are made true, not by facts regarding the topics P and Q are about, but by logical facts about the relation of logical consequence. In contrast, no proposition of the form “It is true that P” could be true in virtue only of properties of the truth predicate or operator. The way I remember Beall telling it, a theory about T is in the business of telling you what propositions about T are true and which are false. However, it is not its business telling you when a proposition about T follows from another proposition about T, logic does. That is why the truth predicate (and the false predicate) are topic neutral (and in that sense, logical) in a way that the relation of logical consequence. Continue reading
Posted Sep 5, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
Thus if we take the formula above is the only axiom, we can get as simple theorems most of the basic properties of falible systems. For example: take processes of belief formation to be the means we get to reach the truth. Under this assumption,we can interpret the variables, M, E to mean epistemic justification and truth respectively (and consequently, C would be the absence of epistemic luck). Thus, from the above fundamental axiom of falible epistemic justification), we easily get fallibility as theorem: Continue reading
Posted Aug 22, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
Presenting proofs and theories is a task of a fundamentally different sort that understanding, explaining or teaching them. Thus the requirements for one are substantially different from the other, and the difference is so large that it does not boil down to one being more rigorous than the other. In particular, presenting proofs and theories is a communicative task and as such requires our representations to be easily understood by many, while exploring theories and finding proofs in them is the kind of work that is done either by ourselves and in close proximity with others, in other words, they are tasks that take place in heavily contextualized situations. Consequently, the representations we use in these situations can fruitfully exploit the information available in such contexts and need not be meaningful outside them. Continue reading
Posted Jun 5, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
As practices mature, the roles rules play in them change accordingly: First. they tell us how aspects of the practice relate or correspond to analogous aspects in other, more entrenched, similar, practices... Then, as more people engage in the practice and a normal common way of engaging in it emerges, rules are conceived as describing what people do. And finally, as the practice becomes more mature and autonomous, rules are conceived as revealing the practice’s underlying logic, i.e., ... how practitioners can exploit different features of the practice in order to reach their goals in a more efficient and efficacious way Continue reading
Posted Apr 25, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
"The philosophers have ignored the social context of science. The point, however, is to change it." and other great last sentences of philosophy books Continue reading
Posted Mar 17, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
Thank you Manuel for your thoughtful response. You are completely right that not all measures I propose are equally feasible, at least not in the short term. I also agree with you in that an increase in English translations might be the easiest first step in the right direction, but even that requires long term vision. A friend of mine pointed out the possible vicious circle of publishing houses not wanting to translate authors for which there is no audience, so we also need to start building an audience for authors who do currently not write or publish in English; your suggestion of including them as suggested readings in classes seems like a great idea in this respect. It would be great if indicatives like the ASA Curriculum Diversification existed throughout other fields and that it made space for readings in other languages besides English, even if only as suggested readings. If this works, then there would be no excuse not to expect every research publication to make reference to at least some texts originating from non-native English speaking communities. Even now, I do not find unreasonable to demand journals stop publishing new research based only on research done in a single language. I would also suggest journals publishing English précis of work not published in Spanish. The articles at the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy on or “Philosophy of Science in Latin America” are good examples, I think. This solution, of course, who'll also be extended to other philosophical communities.
As long as our paradigm of the political is explicit and conscious public deliberation considering reasons and interests, we marginalize fundamental aspects of the political realm that are implicit, unconscious private and embodied, like emotions. Continue reading
Posted Jan 16, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
However, it is not part of our basic arithmetical knowledge how to multiply infinite decimal expressions, so how do we extrapolate from what we know about the multiplication of finite expressions to infinite expressions? Continue reading
Posted Nov 30, 2016 at Philosophical Percolations
Consider the question of whether a particular norm is conventional. Is it a question about what grounds such norm or is it a question about how we go about complying to it? Or maybe we mean different things when we say that a norm is conventional. From the metaphysical perspective, we might mean that the norm is a norm – that is, that it has normative power over us, because we agreed to it, i.e., because there is a convention in our context to abide by it. Continue reading
Posted Nov 24, 2016 at Philosophical Percolations
Another important and helpful backwards-directed initiative could be to start reading, teaching, commenting, studying already published work from philosopher of underrepresented works. I think it has become unavoidable to expect professional philosophers to be able to work and publish in a different language than their own. I find it completely astounding that American universities, for example, would still hire mono-lingual philosophers or philosophers who only publish in English. Also, Academic presses should do a better job of publishing translations of philosophical work from underrepresented traditions.
Reidentification: How is it possible to know that we are dealing with the same object, instead of two? Independece: How do we know that objects exist? Non-solipsism: How is it possible to make a difference between us and the (so-called external) world? Continue reading
Posted Oct 24, 2016 at Philosophical Percolations
...women lives are more tightly interwoven with the lives of non-women – not just because they live together, but because they commonky build string bonds of caring and other affects with them – that the lives of members of one ethnic group are related to the lives of members of a different ethnic group. To paraphrase Paloma Hernández, it is more common for a woman to have a non-woman child or life partner that an African-american having a non-African-american child or life partner. Continue reading
Posted Oct 10, 2016 at Philosophical Percolations
A good philosopher has a clear intention, a commitment to quality over quantity. Many philosophers may make the same claim, but are reluctant to actually make tough choices. Consider how emotionally hard it can be to cut texts that have already been written or abandon positions already defended in print. A good philosopher must not be afraid of making a tough choice that would make him unpopular. She must be willing to risk her popularity with others in the pursuit of truth. She must transcend any feelings of greed, attachment, and fear that might accompany such a decision. Continue reading
Posted Aug 15, 2016 at Philosophical Percolations
There is no question-begging way to keep the Rhythm and Blues that African Americans play and listen to within the Rhythm and Blues Canon while also excluding both the white-washed version at the top of the Billboard charts and the Mexican version people still listen to and play all over the country. Continue reading
Posted Jul 27, 2016 at Philosophical Percolations