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Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia
Mexico City
Recent Activity
having a sharp image of X is not seeing X in a different way that having a blurry image of it, but seeing facts about X (i.e. X seeing X as having certain determinate properties) that X objectively has that you would miss when your view of X is blurrier. Continue reading
Posted Aug 22, 2019 at Philosophical Percolations
In (2017), Starmans, Sheskin and Bloom claim “that when people are asked about the ideal distribution of wealth in their country, they actually prefer unequal societies” (Starmans, Sheskin and Bloom 2007, 1) and refer to five studies as evidence:(Norton and Ariely 2011), (Arsenio, Preziosi, Silberstein & Hamburger 2013), (Norton, et al. 2014), (Kiatpongsan and Nortonshowed 2014). However, none of the aforementioned studies give much support to Starmans, Sheskin and Bloom’s assertion: Continue reading
Posted Jun 14, 2019 at Philosophical Percolations
The overall general strategy in both cases is to argue that without numbers, it would be very hard to explain why things that we accept to be true – or at least, to be successful as claims about the world, like simple arithmetical truths like seventeen being prime, complex physical laws like the superposition principle or just everyday assertions like there being twelve judges in the Supreme Court – are actually true. The basic idea is that something cannot be true unless the things it is about actually exist. Thus, if we know what something is true and that it is about some category of things, then we have good reasons to conclude that such things do exist. Continue reading
Posted Apr 22, 2019 at Philosophical Percolations
Thank you do much for your comments Moira! (a) Yeah, I battled a lot about whether this applies only to certain departments or not. In the end, I preferred applying it t across the board, but reduce its value to only one point. This whole second section on one point elements was very much in response to this sort of concerns: [Disclaimer, I appear in at least one of Chalmer's photos, and have had drinks with him on several occasions] (b) I completely agree and that is why I added "contact with philosophers from the Hispanic world" which, you are completely right, might contribute more to inclusivity that including scholarship from Latinx studies in the USA.
We do not feel ashamed of being weak or a failure, but in being judged as weak or a failure. As a matter of fact, the very notions of ‘weak’, ‘a failure’ or anything we might think would be something we might feel ashamed of being is always judgment-dependent in the sense that even though it might denote an objective feature of us – our strength, appearance, material status, etc. – its extension is still fixed by appeal to social standards or, at least, the subjective standards of others. Continue reading
Posted Oct 24, 2018 at Philosophical Percolations
If we wanted to precisify the edge of the hill, we could end up with a line like this, but this does not mean that this line could or might be the edge of the hill. There is some sort of modality involved in precification thus understood, but this is not the usual alethic, epistemic or deontic modalities that you think; it must be a sui-generis sort of modality. Continue reading
Posted Sep 7, 2018 at Philosophical Percolations
A post shared by Axel Arturo Barceló (@barcelo.axel) on Apr 26, 2018 at 7:20am PDT by Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia Many political and philosophical approaches to the ontology of social categories stress their social and ethnic aspects. According to these socio-ethnic accounts what makes someone belong to a given category... Continue reading
Posted May 2, 2018 at Philosophical Percolations
The key point of these proposals is to argue that the property in question P is not actually a property that an object of the proper kind either has or has not, but rather a gradual property that can only be had to some degree or other. This means that, between things that are P and those that are not-P, there are intermediate cases that are neither P nor not-P. Continue reading
Posted Mar 26, 2018 at Philosophical Percolations
The first, and perhaps most radical solution to conflicting evidence is to accept the ensuing contradiction, not as a problem to solve, but as a feature of the phenomenon. The basic idea is that, since both the evidence for and against A being P must be accepted as equally good, then what it shows is that, for the particular case of A and P, it must be true true that A its both P and not P. That this sort of solution is not absurd has been productively explored by philosophers and logicians like Graham Priest (1985) or JC Beall (2009), among others. This solution is usually accompanied by a proposal to change the underlying logic to a paraconsistent logic to allow this kind of contradictions. The main feature of these logics that makes them fit for dialetheism is that they help us distinguish between exploding and non-exploding contradictions, that is, contradictions that entail everything and, therefore, make any theory that contains them collapse into absurdity, and contradictions that do not and, therefore, can be incorporated into a theory without catastrophic consequences. Continue reading
Posted Nov 6, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
...realistic pictures, and other depictions. This sort of pictures hold a middle ground between symbols like words and signals like footprints. Like symbols, they represent what they represent by an artificial and intentional act – the act of artificially reproducing the visual appearance of its object –, but like signals they relay on something that is naturally linked to what they depict – the appearance they reproduce. Continue reading
Posted Oct 26, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
Delusions are not rational in the externalist sense of being the product of a well-functioning reliable cognitive system. On the contrary, there is ample evidence that some cognitive malfunctions are involved. Furthermore, they are not rational in an internalist, deontological sense either, since this sort of rationality requires the agent to have a well-functioning conscious, control system (corresponding to S1 in dual system theory), and delusional agents’ conscious control systems are too tied to the false and recalcitrant delusional belief. Continue reading
Posted Oct 13, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
You perfectly identified the central issues involved Alan! 1. Is Beall endorsing a kind of relativism of logical consequence that embraces paraconsistency (ala Priest) in at least some contexts of discourse (here apparently theology/Christology)? Yes, exactly. 2. You are completely right in insisting that this requires a revision of material implication and to whether this is truth-functional or not. Hence, Beall (and I) adopt a four valued logic, so as to not end with such an impoverished version of material implication. I do not know if I can do justice to Beall's views on material implication in a short commentary, but what I am commenting here is on a series of three talks, JC Beall just gave in Mexico City and the third talk was precisely on this, i.e., on material implication in a paraconsistent logic. The talk had to be shortened because of the Earthquake that just hit Mexico, but there is a vide of the talk here:
¡That is a great question! I suspect the difference is smaller than Beall would like, but I must be fair to him so I have added the following to the post: " What Beall wants is logical pluralism, without truth pluralism. He wants for there to be many ‘right’ relations of logical consequence (not all equally good for any purpose, for some better fit for certain theoretical purposes and others better fit for other purposes), without the undersirable relativistic consequence that there are many ‘right’ properties of truth. Thus, he needs to drive a wedge between truth and logical consequence. Thus, it is not that there be a difference between truth and logical consequence. After all, that – that truth is not validity – is something we learn in our first day of introductory logic! Beall needs to show that this well known distinction between truth and logical validity somehow corresponds with a substantial way of drawing the line so that there is room for logical pluralism, but not for truth! In an unpublished manuscipt, he writes: “The construction of true theories involves the construction of consequence (closure) relations for those theories – an entailment relation that serves to ‘complete’ the theory (as far as possible) by churning out all of the truths that follow (that are entailed by) the claims in the theory…The theorist’s task is to construct a set of truths about a target phenomenon and close that set of truths under the consequence rela- tion that, by the theorist’s lights, is the right relation to ‘complete’ the true theory of the given phenomenon.”"
True propositions of the form ‘P follows from Q’ are made true, not by facts regarding the topics P and Q are about, but by logical facts about the relation of logical consequence. In contrast, no proposition of the form “It is true that P” could be true in virtue only of properties of the truth predicate or operator. The way I remember Beall telling it, a theory about T is in the business of telling you what propositions about T are true and which are false. However, it is not its business telling you when a proposition about T follows from another proposition about T, logic does. That is why the truth predicate (and the false predicate) are topic neutral (and in that sense, logical) in a way that the relation of logical consequence. Continue reading
Posted Sep 5, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
Thus if we take the formula above is the only axiom, we can get as simple theorems most of the basic properties of falible systems. For example: take processes of belief formation to be the means we get to reach the truth. Under this assumption,we can interpret the variables, M, E to mean epistemic justification and truth respectively (and consequently, C would be the absence of epistemic luck). Thus, from the above fundamental axiom of falible epistemic justification), we easily get fallibility as theorem: Continue reading
Posted Aug 22, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
Yes, I have been working on Penrose’s graphical tensor notation, but again only from the perspective of the notebook and the blackboard, because I assumed they did not make it to the final published papers; thank you for telling me that I was wrong. I will go an look at how they are used there. Do you have any particular examples I might be able to look at?
Thank you, Sara! I was about to go into my colleague's offices to photograph their blackboards myself (I already started asking for their permission)! Yes, I knew the paper, I did not know you took the photographs. I am glad ours are white, and easier to photograph
Presenting proofs and theories is a task of a fundamentally different sort that understanding, explaining or teaching them. Thus the requirements for one are substantially different from the other, and the difference is so large that it does not boil down to one being more rigorous than the other. In particular, presenting proofs and theories is a communicative task and as such requires our representations to be easily understood by many, while exploring theories and finding proofs in them is the kind of work that is done either by ourselves and in close proximity with others, in other words, they are tasks that take place in heavily contextualized situations. Consequently, the representations we use in these situations can fruitfully exploit the information available in such contexts and need not be meaningful outside them. Continue reading
Posted Jun 5, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
Ok, I do not follow your argument here: "However, the fact remains that the monument was originally created to honor white supremacy and the recent modification seems to be an effort to conceal this fact. As such, the right thing to do would seem to be to remove the monument." I particularly do not see why repurposing an artefact needs to be "an effort to conceal [the] fact" of its original purpose. And I also do not see why this (even if it was the case) would be necessarily a bad thing. Furthermore, removing a monument of this kind could also be conceived as an effort to conceal the fact that there used to be a monument there with such repulsive original function.
Toggle Commented Apr 26, 2017 on Confederate Monuments at Philosophical Percolations
As practices mature, the roles rules play in them change accordingly: First. they tell us how aspects of the practice relate or correspond to analogous aspects in other, more entrenched, similar, practices... Then, as more people engage in the practice and a normal common way of engaging in it emerges, rules are conceived as describing what people do. And finally, as the practice becomes more mature and autonomous, rules are conceived as revealing the practice’s underlying logic, i.e., ... how practitioners can exploit different features of the practice in order to reach their goals in a more efficient and efficacious way Continue reading
Posted Apr 25, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
Yes, thank you
Excellent question, and I may be wrong, but I think the argument that "since some response from the world is better than no response, it is clearly better to have some viable red line rather than one everyone will simply ignored" still stands, right?" In other words, even if X way of killing civilians is not substantially worse than Y way of killing civilians, it might still be better to adopt the rule that we will only respond to X ways and not to Y way, because we cannot react to both Xs and Yx anyway, and we might still react only to Ys.
Great one indeed! Thank you
Toggle Commented Mar 22, 2017 on Last words at Philosophical Percolations
"The philosophers have ignored the social context of science. The point, however, is to change it." and other great last sentences of philosophy books Continue reading
Posted Mar 17, 2017 at Philosophical Percolations
Thank you Manuel for your thoughtful response. You are completely right that not all measures I propose are equally feasible, at least not in the short term. I also agree with you in that an increase in English translations might be the easiest first step in the right direction, but even that requires long term vision. A friend of mine pointed out the possible vicious circle of publishing houses not wanting to translate authors for which there is no audience, so we also need to start building an audience for authors who do currently not write or publish in English; your suggestion of including them as suggested readings in classes seems like a great idea in this respect. It would be great if indicatives like the ASA Curriculum Diversification existed throughout other fields and that it made space for readings in other languages besides English, even if only as suggested readings. If this works, then there would be no excuse not to expect every research publication to make reference to at least some texts originating from non-native English speaking communities. Even now, I do not find unreasonable to demand journals stop publishing new research based only on research done in a single language. I would also suggest journals publishing English précis of work not published in Spanish. The articles at the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy on or “Philosophy of Science in Latin America” are good examples, I think. This solution, of course, who'll also be extended to other philosophical communities.