This is Michael Prescott's Typepad Profile.
Join Typepad and start following Michael Prescott's activity
Join Now!
Already a member? Sign In
Michael Prescott
I'm the author of many novels of psychological suspense.
Interests: Shakespeare, philosophy, evolution, spirituality, religion, parapsychology, afterlife studies, synchronicities, thrillers, historical novels, dualism, critiques of philosophical materialism, historical Jesus.
Recent Activity
FYI, I signed in to TypePad since I have an account with them, but as you can see, many other options (Google, Yahoo, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) are available.
Toggle Commented Dec 13, 2012 on IrrationalWiki at Michael Prescott's Blog
From what I've read and seen, Anderson seems legitimate to me. I'm impressed that in his books he includes complete transcripts, not just excerpts. The transcripts are "warts and all" documents that show where he's struggling and sometimes seemingly fishing for info, and where he gets things wrong. He says he includes everything so people will have a more realistic idea of what to expect from a reading. He does struggle with names and sometimes has to work them out almost one letter at a time, which can seem like cold reading, but he has a lot of significant out-of-the-blue "hits" too. As far as remembering people's IP addresses is concerned, I'm afraid I can't spend the time necessary to check the origin of every comment. Commenters do have the option of signing in via various social networks, which would greatly reduce the chance of identity theft. I would recommend trying this. In fact, I'll try it right now! Note: Yes, it works. Just be sure to sign in BEFORE typing your comment, or you will lose it.
Toggle Commented Dec 13, 2012 on IrrationalWiki at Michael Prescott's Blog
Testing TypePad log-in. - MP
Toggle Commented Oct 15, 2012 on Comments at Michael Prescott's Blog
@Michael: But hasn't it always been the ultimate question, 'Who created God'? Posted by: Julie Baxter | May 13, 2012 at 06:44 PM No, that wouldn't be a valid question philosophically, because it ignores the distinction between contingent and necessary facts. If God or any so-called First Cause or Prime Mover had to be created, then it would be a contingent fact, whereas the argument requires the First Cause to be necessary, not contingent. The idea is that all the constituents of the physical world are contingent, so if there is a necessary fact, it must lie outside of or apart from anything physical. For convenience we call this nonphysical First Cause by the name of God, though the argument doesn't imply or require a personal God or a God with the qualities depicted in the Bible, etc. The argument can be attacked at two points: first, the claim that if all the parts of the universe are contingent, then the universe as a whole must be contingent; and second, the claim that an infinite regression is impossible, leaving a necessary first cause as the only logical alternative. Either of these claims is disputable, although both seem pretty reasonable to me. In combination with the argument from design, which is bolstered by the extremely unlikely set of "cosmic coincidences" that rendered our universe stable and habitable, the first cause argument is pretty good, I think.
Toggle Commented May 14, 2012 on Something from Nothing at Paranormalia
As Moi pointed out, the purely scientific argument seems to overlook or misconstrue the actual philosophical/ theological argument, which involves the distinction between necessary and contingent facts. This is not a question that can be resolved by scientific inquiry, which by its nature is limited to investigating contingencies. In other words, a scientist may be able to trace the origin of an oak tree to an acorn, and trace that acorn to an earlier oak tree, and so on, all the way back (in theory) to the Big Bang. And maybe he can even trace the origin of the Big Bang to some prior event or state. But he's still dealing with a chain of contingencies. The philosophical crux is that if we are to avoid an infinite regress, we need a starting point that is not contingent, but exists in and of itself. Since all physical things are contingent, it (probably) follows that the universe as a whole is contingent. But in this case, the necessary starting point must lie outside of or apart from the universe of physical things, which places it outside the realm of science, or at least the physical sciences.
Toggle Commented May 13, 2012 on Something from Nothing at Paranormalia
Michael Prescott is now following The Typepad Team
Mar 15, 2010