Above comment was not from Gene Callahan but me - worrying that Wordpress can let you comment as someone else - bug

Nick last time I looked Mark Carney doesn't sell autographs - the office of debt management sells his autographs and the bank of England no longer has control over that. This matters because in most modern states the central bank no longer controls autograph production (sorry the unit of account) the state does in net unit of account destruction (tax payments) or production (state spending) - unless (legally blocked in most countries) the state allows debt monetisation/helicopter money. All the state can do is affect the futures market for autographs (securities sales a deflationary transfer payment)and similarly central banks (through open market operations). This shifts the consumption of autograophs in time (through deflating or inflating demand in time) but they cannot through these means affect the total consumption of autographs - only net state spending/taxation can do that. Monetary policy shuffles around the deckchairs, only fiscal policy builds battleships. Andrew Lainton (did you see my post on central bank liabilities https://andrewlainton.wordpress.com/2015/01/20/is-state-outside-money-a-liability-and-if-so-to-whom/ )

Where the infrastructure is critical to the project can't the developer request that the LPA (and potentially other third parties) to sign a S106 which is non monetary but says we will build this scheme to this phasing if you build this infrastructure to this phasing?

Ive written on this issue here My view is that the Stevenage Core Strategy decision could be challenged, after all it was just before Cala II came out, but even so once localism Bill gains royal assent Stevenage could argue that North Herts has failed in their duty to coopoerate and as they had to comply with RSS and cooperate the plan was deliverable. There is PAS advice on enacting the duty but I feel it doesn't go nearly far enough and to comply with SEA directive some form of informal joint examination will be needed, otherwise all issues of reasonable alternatives will fall on the first examination to come forward in a sub-region. http://andrewlainton.wordpress.com/2011/06/17/national-planning-policy-forensics-16-larger-than-local-planning/ http://andrewlainton.wordpress.com/2011/06/18/national-planning-policy-framework-forensics-16-examining-plans/ http://andrewlainton.wordpress.com/2011/05/31/gaming-the-system-through-not-progressingadopting-development-plans/ http://andrewlainton.wordpress.com/2011/05/29/cala-ii-decision-in/ http://andrewlainton.wordpress.com/2011/06/21/latest-bizarre-stevenage-twist/

Marx's exposition had it been a general exposition on JS Mill and Thornton's ideas on credit which inspired Mill. Marx, without full credit (though as others note these were only working notes), agrees with J S Mill that the fact that products are sold at T+1 when goods are bought and wages paid at T creates what might be caused a 'realisation problem' with capitalism which invalidates what today we would call 'Says identity' :- supply creates its own demand at every point in time. Credit fills this gap - after Thornton (understanding this 'gap' led to Walras neglected theory of money, which influenced Wicksells theory of interest, a key influence on Keynes). If the expected price at T+1 is not realised then expected profits are not realised. Where Marx (in this chapter) advanced beyond the earlier classical economists was in understanding three things, firstly that lower, or no, profits as a result would result in less investment/accumulation, secondly that lower wages would lower demand across the full spectrum of products not just in that sector - i.e. malinvestment impacts on aggregate demand, thirdly that it impacts on the valuation of fixed capital, it is overvalued because the assumption of T+1 productivity is misvalued, this can cause less purchase of intermediate products and fixed capital to maintain profit rates. All of these can cumulatively cause crisis. The 'over production' theory. Marx also briefly alludes to an improved technique in one firm triggering unemployment in competitors, as well as unanticipated shortages in resources causing price rises, but appears to treat such 'shocks' as separate from his main line of argument. What then causes the trigger point? Marx here is less clear. He seems to be relying on the earlier Sisimondi concept that increasing capital intensity and lower wages causes 'under consumption'. A basis for a 'general glut' rather than one specific to a sector. Here though Marx makes a similar gaff to Major Douglas, though an illuminating one. If Price=fixed Capital+wages+profit, Douglas believed that wages were always less than price of goods so there was always a shortage in demand. The blunder being the wages of those (dated labour) producing fixed capital in earlier periods. Similarly Marx blundered but not fully accounting for the expenditure of capitalists profit on future luxury goods. Both blunders were illuminating though because they both shine light on the temporal differences between calculation of supply price and realisation of associated demand prices. The 'law of markets' only hold if prices are anticipated correctly. JS Mill of course went on to defend, in the long run, a version of Says Law in that in time prices and wages would adjust to prevent a general glut. Keynes, in the General Theory, argues that sticky prices and hoarding of profits slows this process creating sustained unemployment. What got lost for a long while was the critical role of credit in this process. If credit is advanced on the basis of a speculative increase in prices which is unsustainable, particularly in those asset prices which are not elastically 'produced', such as land. A proper understanding of crisis then depends on Kalecki, Fisher, Minsky, Keen, Koo and George, where their focus on credit expansion, speculation, popping of assett bubbles, and for some of these authors, negative balance sheets, deflation and deleveraging - creating the 'paradox of deleveraging' in Koo's term, creating a genuine general glut as when most sectors simultaneously attempt to deleverage it reduces savings/investments as people pay off debts which become greater as a surplus of sellers of assets pushes down balance sheet prices. 'The curse of credit as a flux of exchanges is that it expands when there is a tendency to speculation, and sharply contracts just when most needed to assure confidence…”(Henry George) For all of Marx and Keynes insights they didn't fully join the dots. Marx saw the realisation problem, but wrongly diagnosed its cause. Keynes similarly with liquidity.