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Jussi Suikkanen
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HERE is the programme of the first New Methods of Ethics Conference, which will be held here at the University of Birmingham in September (15th and 16th). The conference is free and open to all, but please book a place... Continue reading
Posted Jul 20, 2016 at PEA Soup
I am organising two conferences here at Birmingham on the methods of moral philosophy. The first one of these will take place on the 15th and 16th of September 2016 and the keynote speakers at this conference will be Antti... Continue reading
Posted Feb 18, 2016 at PEA Soup
The second annual conference of the Centre for the Study of Global Ethics in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Birmingham welcomes submissions on any topic related to global ethics, but will prioritize work focusing on the 2016... Continue reading
Posted Oct 12, 2015 at PEA Soup
Welcome everyone to PEA Soup's second JESP discussion. The target article this time is Matt King's (University of Alabama, Birmingham) recent "Manipulation Arguments and the Moral Standing to Blame", which is a very interesting exploration of when we (and God)... Continue reading
Posted Aug 24, 2015 at PEA Soup
I'm pleased to announce the second discussion of a Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy (JESP) article here at PEA Soup. The article in question will be Matt King's (University of Alabama at Birmingham) "Manipulation Arguments and the Moral Standing... Continue reading
Posted Jul 9, 2015 at PEA Soup
I very much love Michael Smith’s recent paper “A Constitutivist Theory of Reasons: Its Promise and Parts” (Law, Ethics and Philosophy 2013, also available on his website). One thing that strikes me about this paper is that, whilst discussing Parfit’s... Continue reading
Posted Apr 1, 2015 at PEA Soup
Hi Ralph thanks for this - very interesting. Just a couple of quick comments: A) I wasn't sure whether you wanted to draw from the conclusion that Fine's argument to the conclusion that normative necessity is distinct from metaphysical necessity fails a further conclusion that normative necessity really is metaphysical necessity. It seems to me that, even if the failure of this argument means that as far as this argument is concerned normative necessity can be a form of metaphysical necessity, it would be still be nice to have positive reasons for thinking that it is. I wasn't sure whether there were such positive reasons here apart from the rhetorical questions. 2. I have a guess of what might be going on in Fine's argument. Maybe he is thinking that normativity is always a relational property - that is, what is normative is something like a reason relation between a fact and an act (and properties like badness can be reduced to such relations). He might be then thinking that metaphysical necessities in 1 that are based on the essence of a thing must be monadic, non-relational intrinsic properties any duplicate would share no matter what relations it was in. This would be a reason to think that normative properties as relational properties are not a part of the metaphysical necessities. My inclination to resist this argument would be to argue that relational properties, especially dispositional ones, can be a part of a thing's essence.
As a part of a paper I am working on (very early stages and so the rest will be very sketchy), I would like to argue that different epistemic norms govern normative beliefs and other beliefs with ordinary, purely naturalist... Continue reading
Posted Jan 6, 2015 at PEA Soup
I’m preparing a course on climate change ethics and as a part of this I am reading again John Broome’s fascinating Climate Matters – Ethics in a Warming World book. One thing Broome does in this book is to offer... Continue reading
Posted Nov 12, 2014 at PEA Soup
Ken Shockey from the University of Buffalo asked me to post the following call for abstracts for a workshop on Loss, Damage and Harm. This workshop will be held on 8th and 9th of May 2015 at the University of... Continue reading
Posted Oct 20, 2014 at PEA Soup
This post will be difficult to write as I’ll have to reign in my frustrations (I was thinking of calling this ‘Must Do Better’ or ‘All Souls Night, Part II’…). I’ve been reading Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek’s and Peter Singer’s The... Continue reading
Posted Aug 22, 2014 at PEA Soup
I was asked to post the following call for papers for a climate change ethics conference that looks very interesting. This is a workshop in Helsinki, Finland (the good old days...) from 11th to 13th of November, 2014. The confirmed... Continue reading
Posted Jul 11, 2014 at PEA Soup
My apologies for the slight delay - we thought it would be nice to give some extra time for Nomy Arpaly's wonderful post about moral concerns and praiseworthiness (and I hope that the discussion of that post will still continue).... Continue reading
Posted Jun 17, 2014 at PEA Soup
Thanks everyone for the amazing discussion on Jack Woods's expressivism paper! On Monday the 16th of June, we'll be able to begin our first ever discussion of an article published in the Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy (JESP). This... Continue reading
Posted May 27, 2014 at PEA Soup
My apologies about the delay and I do recommend also checking out Richard's Arneson's interesting post on moral luck below, but we are finally able to begin the discussion of Jack Woods's Philosophers' Imprint paper 'Expressivism and Moore's Paradox'. To... Continue reading
Posted May 22, 2014 at PEA Soup
Just a quick reminder that on Thursday the 22nd of May we'll start the online discussion on Jack Woods's wonderful Philosophers' Imprint article "Expressivism and Moore's Paradox" (please follow the link in the title to the article itself) here at... Continue reading
Posted May 20, 2014 at PEA Soup
May will be a busy month here at the PEA Soup. After a discussion of Jennifer Hawkins's excellent paper on 5th of May, we have our first discussion of a Philosophers' Imprint paper scheduled for the end of the month.... Continue reading
Posted Apr 28, 2014 at PEA Soup
It is often thought that one central advantage of expressivism over subjectivism is that expressivism can make sense of moral disagreements. Whereas according to subjectivism, people end up talking past one another, expressivism enables speakers to express disagreements in attitude... Continue reading
Posted Apr 16, 2014 at PEA Soup
My collegue Jeremy Williams is organising two cracking conferences this summer here at Birmingham. The first one of these, Ethics, War and Intervention, will be on Friday the 30th of May. The keynote at this conference will be Jeff McMahan... Continue reading
Posted Mar 10, 2014 at PEA Soup
This is merely a request for information. I know that there are lots and lots of applied ethics journals covering bioethics, health care ethics, global ethics, environmental ethics, business ethics, health care ethics, ethics of war and conflict and many... Continue reading
Posted Aug 9, 2013 at PEA Soup
Hi sorry to be so late on this - very interesting discussion. I just wanted to give a quick response of the number 1 type. The uncertainty in question is uncertainty about whether something is wrong overall. Ross predicted that this type of uncertainty is widespread. We've got certainty about what makes acts wrong to a degree but we are rarely certain about where the balance of wrongness lies given that how wrong a consideration makes an act in an individual case varies in different contexts. So, consider a person who thinks that there are various things that make eating meat wrong to a degree (causes pain to the animal, leads to global warming and so on) and various considerations that make eating meat right to a degree (the animal is not a person, it's tasty and so on). If this person is uncertain about where the strenghts of these considerations lies, she might conclude that eating meat might be wrong. Assume then that internalism is true about wrong- and right-making judgments: you can sincerely think that something makes an act right/wrong to a degree only if you are motivated to pursue/avoid that thing (this makes my response a variation of your response). This would mean that the person who thinks that eating meat might be wrong would have to care de re about the things that make that act right and wrong even if they are uncertain about the overall judgment. If this person then decides not to eat meat on the grounds that it might be wrong, it is guaranteed that she will have appropriate motivations.
Toggle Commented Jul 30, 2013 on Moral Uncertainty and Motivation at PEA Soup
I’ve been recently interested in subjectivism and how serious the objections to it are in the end. In part, this is a project of thinking how well or badly off the view comes out when we compare it to expressivism.... Continue reading
Posted May 13, 2013 at PEA Soup
I know that a lot philosophers I have met and a lot of you who read this blog are avid readers of novels. Because of this, I wanted to post a 'bleg' ('an entry on a blog requesting information or... Continue reading
Posted Apr 24, 2013 at PEA Soup
There are many ethical theories that think of right and wrong in terms of what consequences the general adoption of moral principles would have. Contractualists think of what consequences the principles would have for individual lives; rule-consequentialists think of what... Continue reading
Posted Feb 16, 2013 at PEA Soup
All of you are of course aware that here in the UK there has been huge phone hacking scandal. This scandal lead to the Leveson Inquiry on Culture, Practice, and Ethics of Press. Last week, on Monday 16th of July,... Continue reading
Posted Jul 25, 2012 at PEA Soup