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(WSR) Subjective rationality demands that S be such that she does not intend to X if she believes that she will not X. Hi Doug, I didn't read the above, but it looks to me like all you need to get the narrow scope conclusion is the modal principle K. K is about as weak as it gets with modal principles, but it can still generate worries. Here's K. K. L(p -> q) -> (Lp -> Lq) Your interpretation of L is 'demanded by subjective rationality'. So, principle K in your case ensures closure under rational demands. My worry for the use of this principle is that it validates strengthening antecedents. So suppose from the wide scope principle you get to the conclusion, that it is rationally demanded that p only if it is rationally demanded that q. 1. Lp --> Lq The problem is that (1) entails (2), for any r at all. 2. (Lp & r) -> Lq So, from (1) and any r at all, if Lp and r, then it is rationally demanded that q. That can't be right. If it is rationally demanded that I not believe I will do x and r = I learn that I'll do x, then it is rationally required that I not intend x? What you'll need I think for the inference is some conditional that does not validate strengthening antecendents. A subjunctive, maybe.
In essence, the indirect approach argued (i) that free will is necessary for some other thing x, and (ii) that x exists. Does this look like the following? 1. O --> F where O is the relevant observation and F is free will. We observe O and conclude F. So, why not the same against free will. 2. O --> ~F where the observation that O entails that ~F. In that case we have an indirect argument against free will that takes the same form as the indirect argument for free will. Either both are indirect or neither is. In both cases we can reformulate in terms of sufficient conditions. van Inwagen gives something like an argument based on (2) that appeals to the (in principle) observation of chancy behavior in indeterminsitic worlds (the replay argument).