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Pete Mandik
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Response to Lyndon. My visual images are rarely as vivid as open-eye visual perceptions, but the images do vary in vivacity. Especially at night, when I'm pretty relaxed, but not drowsy, I can form incredibly vivid visual images. My main means of distinguishing them from perceptions is not vivacity, but the directness of control that I can exert upon them. I also find it to be introspectively clear that there's a difference between a thought and a visual image. One sort of example that brings this out is to form a visual image of an expanse of red while simultaneously thinking the thought "this is not an image of an expanse of green." I also find Descartes remarks about chiliagons pretty convincing on this matter.
Toggle Commented Jun 30, 2014 on Who knew!? at The Philosophers' Cocoon
Are you aware of the phenomenological penny wars? There's apparently some dispute about whether obliquely viewed coins have an elliptical appearance. I think they do, and am amazed that there's room for controversy. But apparently there is. See this for instance: http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzAbs/Flat.htm
Toggle Commented Jun 23, 2014 on Who knew!? at The Philosophers' Cocoon
Interesting points, Marcus. Maybe you're not deriving dualism from something epistemic. I don't know, I'd need to hear more. Why do you think it's true that "for there to *be* relational properties all, there must be fundamentally intrinsic, qualitative properties"? More to the point: Can you give me some reason for believing that there *are* any intrinsic properties that doesn't involve appealing to some allegedly special epistemic whatsit, like so-called direct acquantaince with phenomenal properties? And here's a way of putting my worry about whether your metaphilosophy hangs with your antiphysicalism. If it is true that science only delivers relational properties, and, as you've been arguing in this post, conceptual determinacy requires testable predictions, then concept of so-called intrinsic qualitative properties is in deep doo-doo. Isn't it?
Thanks, Marcus. If your open mind is in a hurry, you can skip to section 3 and start there.
Hi Marcus, Thanks for your continued kind words about SpaceTimeMind. I've been really enjoying and nodding vigorously in agreement with your recent run of posts on metaphilosophy. Thumbs up to "Natural Philosophy" and "philosopher-scientists." I'm inclined, though, to think that some of your first-order philosophy, in particular the anti-physicalism, doesn't quite hang with this metaphilosophy. Maybe you'd be better off joining me and the other Type-Q Materialists: http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/typeq.pdf We'd love to have you!
I'm not sure which part I loved more: Dawkins getting a craniotomy by the owl's eye lasers at 5:41 or when Dawkins starts rippin' it on his electric tooter at 7:59. But both parts were so totally awesome that I can't see how there can be any room for rational disagreement.
Thanks for assembling the singularity links, Dave. I was just recently trying to chase those down myself. One symposium contribution you left out is Eric Steinhart's: http://ericsteinhart.com/articles/singularity.pdf
Toggle Commented Mar 11, 2013 on Four symposia at fragments of consciousness
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Nick raises an interesting challenge, but I think it can be met. I think a distinction can be drawn between the role of experience in science and the appeal to experience by libertarians in a way that generally supports Neil's point without damning the whole of empirical science. An individual relying only on sense experience (unaided by measuring sticks or other devices) might be unreliable as a detector of object size, but nonetheless, operating in consort with other investigators and aided by theory and instrumentation, object sizes can be reliably ascertained. This overcoming of individual sensory unreliability is achievable in part because there are multiple converging lines of evidence for the phenomenon at hand (as well as a theory that can guide in the calibration of instruments and the correction of individual divergences). The above sort of thing is what keeps empirical science objective, not some reliable connection of the form: sense-seems that P therefore P. But the above sort of thing doesn't seem to be what the libertarians are appealing to in the quotes that Neil presents. They seem instead from making a move from it introspectively seeming that P to P, a move that the stuff Schwitzgebel collects helps cast into doubt. Indeed, one might argue that there's nothing else that they *could* appeal to, nothing sufficiently analogous to the multiple lines of converging evidence that grounds the ultimate reliability of our size judgments.
Toggle Commented Aug 16, 2011 on Libertarian physics at Flickers of Freedom
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Aug 16, 2011