The idea that a private education teaches you self-confidence is partially true - being told you are a member of an elite will probably boost self-esteem - but it's mostly flannel intended to obscure by indirection the transactional nature of the system. Your parents are buying you a better chance of getting into a top university and/or leading profession. They rarely care about the intrinsic values of Latin poetry. For that reason, I agree that there is no need to abolish private schools. The better approach would be for those elite universities and professional bodies to apply quotas based on secondary education. The Texas model would be appropriate for the former (every school & 6th form college gets a pro-rata quota across the Russell Group), while the latter could simply have a gross quota for annual qualification awards (if private school pupils are 7% of the total population, then only 7% of new accountants each year can have gone to private schools). In a system based on equality of outcome, the interests of the sharp-elbowed middle-class would be best served by spreading evenly across all schools instead of concentrating in a few where competition for quota places would be fiercer. The result is that not only would state schools become more socially representative but "bog standard" ones would acquire a powerful constituency of supporters. This would in turn reduce the power, and absolute number, of private schools. The one profession I wouldn't initially introduce quotas for would be teaching. If more of the privately educated start to gravitate towards this career, we might see a reversal in the steady denigration of the role since the 1980s and an increase in public respect.

The first reason you offer is power. You could have stopped there. The other three are essentially exceptions and marginal situations that wouldn't necessarily impede the rollout of AI (most business decisions aren't based on innovation, nor do they require a compelling story). A hunch, or breaking the rules, might possibly produce stellar results, but most businesses will be aiming simply to be better than average - to avoid the drop rather than win the league, so to speak. That means bureaucratic risk-averseness (that broken rule might kill the business) may actually encourage the use of AI. As regards the "fallible entertainers" point, that may well be true for politicians and commentators, but it is less likely to be the case for CEOs, as Woodford shows, and it largely applies only at the very top of the professional tree. Tory MPs who witnessed Boris Johnson's shortcomings as Foreign Secretary at first hand aren't being entirely irrational in thinking he should be PM. They believe the job demands personality and will, rather than mastery of a brief. NB: The c-suite role that is most suitable to a constrained optimisation approach, and in which hunches and breaking the rules are most frowned upon, is the CFO. This is quite a simple "algorithm", which can be implemented via a spreadsheet (1980s vintage) rather than a GAN, so it ought to be more vulnerable to AI than other roles, yet there has been no meaningful attempt to automate it.

One of the ironies of May's tenure is that she garnered a lot of support among Tory MPs, despite being a remainer, precisely because they thought she would put the interests of the party first. A further irony is that the Tories' best hope now may well be to elect Johnson as leader precisely because he is a lying opportunist. He is probably the only candidate who stands a chance of getting away with a reverse ferret and thus preventing a split that would put them out of power for a generation.

Leaving aside his reductio ad absurdum, Dipper frames the question of what the left can do in terms of imposing control, but this gets the issue the wrong way round. The problem with the "free press" is that it is already controlled. It is no coincidence that the press itself has displayed an antipathy towards social media and unconventional online journalism. It is also no coincidence that it is supposedly progressive elements of the press, like the Guardian, who have been most vocal in their criticism of new media.

I am frankly appalled that you failed to condemn Edward I's disgusting Scotophobia.

@Paul0Evans1, "Even the question of 'what you want' is interesting, because in other spheres of life, you don't find out what people want by asking them. You use much more effective feedback loops to work out what they *really* want." This sounds like revealed preference theory, which implies a transactional model of democracy. But the problem with this (and I confess I haven't read your 'Abolish Voting' so I don't know whether you adequately address it), is that we don't reveal our preferences equally, whether through consumption or other feedback mechanisms. For example, the "just get on with it" school are clearly not plagued by self-doubt, while the statistically significant "don't knows" will include many who would welcome a dialogic approach rather than some bloodless, empirical analysis.

You might also have mentioned the consistency illusion, which you wrote about last week. Some people are actively "re-evaluating" Jackson's music, not just boycotting him, presumably because they feel they must have misjudged him (or been conned) in the past.. As regards the media, I think another dimension to this is their tendency to present issues in binary terms as part of their commitment to "balance", which gives the impression that opinions are far more divided and entrenched than they are in reality.

The danger with thinking of the will of the people as emergent is it becomes a quasi-mystical entity, which opens the door to the usual suspects presenting themselves as its unique avatar. But that doesn't make it a "fiction", any more than an election result can be dismissed in the same way. What would be a fiction is "the settled will of the people".

I think it's useful to question whether politics has been framed as consumption in order to better suit supply-side interests (retail-oriented parties, the media etc) or if it simply reflects the absorption of a hegemonic consumer culture. In other words, is "consumer politics" functional or ideological. If it were simply ideological, we'd expect it to reflect changes in retail culture. This has happened at the edges - e.g. the use of focus groups and more recently online feedback, but it's small beer. Whatever the expectation of leave voters, there is no move towards the Amazonification of politics outside the Communist Party of China. If consumer politics is primarily functional, then we'd expect there to be fewer problems in this approach on the supply-side than the demand-side. You suggest that "Shops do not ignore the preferences of 48% of their customers". But this is meaningless unless a shop expects 100% of the population to patronise it. In reality, shops target market segments, and so do parties. "Nor do they expect us to choose a job lot of groceries in advance only once every few years". True, but not all shops are grocers. If you're buying a car, or a house, or further education, you expect to put up with the same product for years. "And nor do they regard increased demand as a problem". Well, Burberry certainly did. I suspect that adopting consumer techniques and rhetorical tropes is functional: it suits the vested interests of parties (i.e. as institutions), the media (for whom politics is marketing), and career politicians for whom a "new product launch" is central to their ascent (I can't be the only one to have noticed the similarities between TIG and a "startup" that is in two minds about an IPO).

"If Johnson and Rees-Mogg had thick Brummie accents, how would the media treat them?" As Jess Phillips would no doubt tell you, it all depends.

@luis, The difference is the nature of the market in which the plumber and the Uber driver participate. The driver can be barred from the market if he refuses too many jobs or his satisfaction rating is too low. That's pretty clear evidence of domination by Uber, akin to the old "lump" system used in construction and the docks. In contrast, the plumber does not have to rely on a mediated market as she can bid for work directly with the paying customer.

I think you're being generous in considering Phillips the least of offenders. She may well be a good constituency MP and has effectively campaigned on domestic violence and other issues, but she has achieved little and seems only too happy to be known for her performance. In a more serious, substantive political culture, I suspect she would be pretty obscure. Her promotion by the media appears to be because her ego is large enough to fill the policy void of centrism. The problem then is not just that we have effaced reality, but that we are beginning to breed monsters.

All states are sovereign, but some are more sovereign than others. Most historians would agree that the constraints imposed on Japan by the international community (mainly the US) in the post-war era were a major factor in its economic growth. Also, it's a de facto one-party state, but I'm not sure whether that's relevant. Just sayin'. More seriously, the relevance of its homogeneous culture to its economic performance is the tendency of its citizens to buy national debt and to invest capital domestically.

Oddly, I have yet to see any criticism of Fraser note that as a C of E Vicar he has a structural interest in promoting "happy families" and marginalising the welfare state. To imagine that Blue Labour's communitarianism is just one preference in a personal liberty / social obligation trade-off strikes me as applying a liberal frame to the exclusion of material interest.

"Obviously, using a Ouija board to decide a man’s guilt is incompetent". I'm not sure that is obvious. Competence simply means getting it right, and in this particular case it appears that the jury were right to convict. In deferring to competence we are simply deferring to then-dominant expertise, but that isn't necessarily any better than random chance: consider the expertise of a Medieval physician or a modern fund manager.

@staberine, A paranoiac thinks the truth is hidden. A cynic thinks it's in plain sight.

@staberinde, The number of articles on matters of identity in the Times/Telegraph/Mail etc vastly outweighs those in the Guardian. Who is setting the agenda there? A cynic might suggest that the performative wokeness of the Guardian is all part of the scam, and that's before you consider their indulgence of transphobia.

@Sesh, I stand by my last paragraph. You are exaggerating. In 2003 it was claimed that Labour were doomed because they'd lost the progressive vote over Iraq. They then won the 2005 general election. It was on a reduced vote (40.7%), but still decisive. Bear in mind that there are plenty of self-styled "progressives" who find an excuse to shun Labour and vote LibDem or Green (not to mention Conservative) at each and every election. They are a noisy claque that is over-represented in the media. The significance of the polls is not that Labour haven't opened up a 20-point lead but that both main parties are on 40%. I suspect the Tories' healthy showing is entirely down to grudging support to get Brexit done. Once it happens, it is hard to believe their numbers will go anywhere but down. Labour's showing is clearly a continuation of the support built in 2017, which has little to do with Brexit and everything to do with their other policies. I'm no fan of the perverse death-wish that is Brexit, but I'm equally repelled by the perversity of so-called progressives who would terminate Labour with extreme prejudice simply to secure a referendum that they've shown themselves as all too capable of losing again. Given that the only viable route to a 2nd referendum is through Labour, you'd imagine that building bridges would be a better strategy for the PV crowd, but it appears they have another agenda.

I think this is a correct analysis given the Parliamentary arithmetic and Labour's conference decisions. That Corbyn & co are simply following their own policy to the letter seems to have surprised many people, for some reason. What was notable about both Simon's and Chris's posts was the emphasis on emotion - the strength of feeling among remainers and the fear of betrayal - which led them to imagine that Labour could be kept out of power by the desertion of progressive voters, or even ended as a viable party. This strikes me an exaggeration. The rarely admitted truth is that "progressive voters" are not all die-hard remainers, and some don't even consider Brexit to be that important. I fear too many people have become emotionally invested in Brexit, which partly explains why Labour's pragmatic approach causes a lot of otherwise rational individuals to lose their shit over anodyne statements on issues such as state aid.

There are two types of sovereignty: internal (who is ultimately in charge?) and external (the exchange of rights and obligations between states). One is foundational, the other contingent. In most representative democracies these are split between different branches of government. External sovereignty is typically reserved to the executive (acting as the agent of the "sovereign", whether that is the people or a constitutional monarch) while internal sovereignty (the ultimate authority of the people) is deemed to be reflected in the legislature. The UK is peculiar because of the concept of parliamentary sovereignty, "the Crown in Parliament", which confuses the two. This is a result of the incomplete revolution of the 17th century: we never fully acknowledged the people as sovereign. This confusion has allowed the forces of the crown to masquerade as democrats, insisting that the EU has encroached on the Commons ("they make all our laws") when what it actually did was circumscribe the executive. Brexit is another cycle in the long-running struggle between Crown and Parliament, but despite the claims that in "taking back control" we are restoring Parliamentary sovereignty, we are actually increasing the power of the executive. That might appear a paradox given the travails of Theresa May, but the longer-term impact will be to make the office of Prime Minister even more dominant (just consider the powers being repatriated from the EU but reserved by Whitehall rather than devolved). Sovereignty may be presented and popularly understood as an intrinsic good, but it is fundamentally (as Dipper noted) a simple matter of power. A confusion over the difference between external and internal sovereignty has led to a situation that will increasingly compromise the latter.

@AMB I think it's both. Brexit is a bitch but the Civil Service is also weaker than it might have otherwise have been, not least because it has gradually lost capability since 1973 as a function of the EU's pooling of competences. The diversion of talent to the City has been a factor, but so to has been the ideological war on big government, which has devalued the very idea of state expertise.

I think the question this raises is: to what extent is the government shit-show symptomatic of structural failings within the state? Despite the Brexit ultras' painting of Olly Robbins as some eminence grise, it's pretty obvious that Whitehall has lacked capacity and often competence. It's not all down to May's stubbornness or lack of finesse.

I think Brexiteers have made this argument, but specifically in terms of the trade-off between higher growth and lower immigration. This has allowed it to be dismissed as the price of xenophobia, marginalising the "procedural utility" angle.

One of the characteristics of the neoliberal era has been the idea that the agenda is set by global forces beyond the control of any domestic political party: "I hear people say we have to stop and debate globalisation. You might as well debate whether autumn should follow summer." - Tony Blair, Labour Party annual conference, 2005. Leaving aside the ideology for a moment, one result of this may have been to lead politicians to assume that they had limited influence on the agenda. I wonder whether a politician from an earlier era might have been more cautious than Cameron in agreeing to a referendum. In other words, the charge that he was insouciant perhaps doesn't account for the extent to which he simply couldn't imagine the agenda being changed in such a dramatic fashion.

Given the number of barristers already in Parliament, the suggestion that court-room procedure should be an example for better political debate is dubious. The Commons is already highly structured, with extensive rules on debate and what is admissible. If anything, it is too lawyerly. If the aim is to establish facts, then the better example would be the scientific method, but that comparison highlights a key difference. While science is open-ended, politics is constrained by deadlines and consequent uncertainty. The one seeks to understand, the other to decide. Debate is an imperfect tool for making decisions, but it may well be the least-worst option we have available.