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The British problems at this stage of the war weren't weapons. The British cruiser tanks were relatively evenly matched against the Germans main battle tanks of the period and were certainly more than a fair match for the Italian tanks they were facing. The British suffered from a very shallow learning curve in adapting to combined arms warfare, especially warfare which needed to use tanks, infantry, artillery, anti-tank weapons and aircraft. Also, they persisted in fielding very tank heavy divisions, which lacked the organic infantry necessary to clear enemy anti-tank weapons and hold terrain against enemy counter-attack. The Germans were fielding panzer divisions which had twice as much infantry as tankers at this point in the war while the British armor units were virtually exclusively tankers. All of the Allies needed to learn the lesson that infantry was vital to an armored division's success. Oddly enough, the only early unit which came close to approximating the German Panzer Divisions was the French Light Mechanized Division of 1940, which was assigned to the Cavalry Corps of all places and acquitted itself well against the Germans in combat.
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Unless I'm mistaken, the 50mm PaK which armed the PzKW Mk III, the real main battle tank for the DAK in 1941, had a range comparable to the 2-pounder on the British cruiser tanks. While the cruiser tanks were lightly armored, the British infantry tanks, especially the Matilda Mk II, were virtually impervious to anything the Germans could throw at them except for the feared "88." The Germans had learned that to their dismay during the Battle of Arras in May 1940 when they were gathering momentum for the drive to the Channel. British tactics failed because without the 25-pounders to drive off the German 88's, the British tanks could be opened like sardine cans at 2000 meters by the 88's when they cavalry charged against the German positions. It took the British another two years to effectively learn combined arms combat, even though they had the basic elements much earlier.
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How can anyone expect the United States to help mediate the conflict at some point in the future if we come down in favor of one country versus the other in a non-binding UN vote. Wouldn't common sense dictate that the United States adopt a neutral stance and try to bring the two parties together in some fashion over the exploration and exploitation of the resource? As everyone on the right complains, a General Assembly vote doesn't mean anything and the British have a veto if it comes to a Security Council vote, so the Obama administration's decision appears to be pitch perfect. The right-wing in the United States needs to get over the fact that they lost the election in 2008 fairly, which is more than can be said about Bush's elections in 2000 and 2004, which they never wanted to be discussed post-election despite Bush's terrible foreign policy decisions over eight years.
Well, who's got the courage to tell the US electorate that the resources required to generate any reasonable chance of success (nothing's guaranteed in this life) will consist of 300K troops and $25 billion in civil aid for 10 years. The Republicans have been lying to the public for the last eight years about how this could be done on the cheap. Now, the bills have finally come in the mail and everybody is afraid to look at them. Everyone's trying to kick that can down the road one more time.
Toggle Commented Oct 8, 2009 on Mission Creep Explained at
"...First, the push to rearmament 1933-39 was consistently forced to face a severe foreign exchange constraint. An oddity of the Nazi economy was its refusal to devalue its currency. Instead, it placed extreme constraints on imports of consumer goods. This was in addition to what everyone already knew, that the Nazi economy held down wages in order to boost profits and stimulate production and hiring..." My take in looking at the data which I first encountered in Williamson Murray's "The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin" was that Germany needed a strong currency in order to purchase the strategic materials it needed for its burgeoning war machine. The Germans needed to buy almost all of the metals and specialty materials required for modern armaments. A depreciating currency would have made that effort much more difficult. If the choice was between buying the chromium, cobalt, aluminum, molybdenum and vanadium (not to mention industrial diamonds) required to produce artillery, tanks, planes and armor plate or consumer goods, then that choice was easy for the Nazi power structure. Besides, wasn't Goering in charge of the Third Reich's economic program. That would have been like allowing Cheney to direct our economic policy for the last eight years.
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You might have also pointed out that pragmatic Demcorats recognized during WW2 that our racist attitudes were imperiling the nation. The United States had a larger population than the Soviet Union, but something like one-sixth of it was African-American, which reduced the potential size of the military accordingly. None other than a child of a slave state, Harry Truman of Missouri, had enough common sense to move on correcting that problem. That's one of the other factors which differentiates real Democrats from Republicans: common sense. Republicans would rather hold their hate close to their bosoms because it feels so good as your boat goes down for the last time. I hate to throw this in, but it is just like the Nazis in WW2 who were shuttling Jews around inside the Reich, to and from death camps, and using up railroad resources accordingly because it was more important to kill Jews than the enemies who were slashing across your borders and bombing your cities. We know how that little experiment in hate ended too, but the haters just can't let go.